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Out of the Shadows: Preventive 
Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War 
By David Cole† 
The United States does not have a statute authorizing preventive detention 
of suspected terrorists without charge.1 Some consider that irresponsible, as it is 
not difficult to imagine circumstances in which the government might want to 
detain a suspected al Qaeda operative, but not be prepared to file charges in 
open court as required for a criminal prosecution. The government may have 
learned of the individual from a confidential or foreign-government source that 
it cannot publicly disclose, or from an ongoing investigation. It may lack 
sufficient evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, but have substantial 
grounds to believe that the individual was actively engaged in armed conflict 
for al Qaeda. The disclosures necessary for a public trial might seriously 
compromise the military struggle against the Taliban and al Qaeda. U.S. law 
has no formal statutory mechanism by which the government could detain such 
a person. Some have suggested that this is a potentially profound defect in our 
national security armature.2 
 
Copyright © 2009 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of 
their publications. 
† Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Ahilan 
Arulanantham, Robert Chesney, Sarah Cleveland, Anthony Dworkin, James Forman, Conor 
Gearty, Richard Goldstone, John Ip, Shane Kadidal, Jules Lobel, Joanne Mariner, Hope Metcalf, 
Eric Posner, Michael Ratner, Sir Adam Roberts, Gabor Rona, Matt Waxman, Pete Wales, and 
Peter Weiss for their comments on drafts of this article. I am especially indebted to my research 
assistant, Chris Segal, for his prodigious work on this article. Part of the article was published in a 
condensed version in the Boston Review. David Cole, Closing Guantánamo, Boston Rev., Jan.–
Feb. 2009, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR34.1/cole.php. 
1. For reviews of other nations’ preventive-detention regimes, see, for example, Law 
Library of Congress, Directorate of Legal Research, LL File No. 2005-01606, 
Preventive Detention: Australia, France, Germany, India, Israel, and the United 
Kingdom (2005); Preventive Detention and Security Law (Andrew Harding & John 
Hatcherd eds., 1993); John Ip, Comparative Perspectives on the Detention of Terrorist Suspects, 
16 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 773 (2007) (comparing the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand). 
2. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Neal Katyal, The Terrorists’ Court, N.Y. Times, July 11, 
2007, at A19; Stephanie Cooper Blum, Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: A Comparison 
of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects, 4 
COLE FINAL 7/1/2009  12:43 AM 
694 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:693 
Others hail the absence of such a preventive-detention law as a testament 
to the United States’ commitment to individual liberty.3 The fact that the 
United States has survived for more than two centuries without employing a 
freestanding preventive-detention law for dangerous persons counsels strongly 
against adopting one now. Preventive-detention laws in other countries have 
often been abused to round up persons who pose little or no real danger.4 The 
United States itself has conducted three significant preventive roundups on 
domestic soil: the Palmer Raids of 1919-20, the internment of Japanese 
Americans and Japanese nationals during World War II, and the detention of 
several thousand Arab and Muslim foreign nationals within the United States in 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.5 In each period, not 
one person detained was identified as posing the threat that was said to justify 
the sweeps in the first place.6 These experiences provide strong support for 
those who oppose calls for preventive detention today. 
Yet the debate about whether the United States should enact a preventive-
detention statute is, in an important sense, misleading. Those who warn that we 
are dangerously unprepared to protect ourselves because of the absence of a 
preventive-detention statute overstate the case; many existing laws and 
authorities can be and have been invoked in an emergency to effectuate 
preventive detention. At the same time, those who object to any preventive-
detention statute as a matter of principle often fail to confront the same fact— 
that even in the absence of a freestanding statute for preventive detention of 
suspected terrorists, there are numerous laws on the books that can be and have 
been employed for those purposes. After 9/11, for example, without ever 
 
Homeland Security Aff., Oct. 2008, at 13 (stating that the United States “attest[s it] need[s] 
preventive detention when evidence is classified or inadmissible—or when [it does] not want to 
compromise methods and sources”), http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=4.3.1; cf. Ben Wittes, Law 
and the Long War 151-82 (2008) (arguing that Congress should authorize preventive detention 
of al Qaeda terrorists); Stuart Taylor Jr., Opening Argument: Terrorism Suspects and the Law, 
Nat’l J., May 12, 2007, available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/ 
nj_20070512_4.php; Stuart Taylor Jr., Al Qaeda Detainees: Don’t Prosecute, Don’t Release, 
Atlantic, Apr. 30, 2002, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/nj/taylor2002-04-
30.htm; Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., The Battle for Our Future: Remarks by 
Secretary Chertoff at Westminster College, (Oct. 17, 2007) (discussing the difficulty of dealing 
with suspected terrorists under current laws), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1193063865526.shtm. 
3. See, e.g., Kenneth Roth, After Guantánamo, Huffington Post, May 5, 2008 (arguing 
that preventive detention would be a “massive loophole to our basic due process rights . . . worse 
than the Guantánamo problem”), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/05/05/usint18752_txt.htm. 
4. See, e.g., Nepal: Terror Law Likely to Boost ‘Disappearances’, Hum. Rts. News, Oct. 
26, 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/10/26/nepal9562.htm; see also Ip, supra note 1, at 773 
(discussing preventive-detention regimes and reactions to them in the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand). 
5. For an account of these detentions, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double 
Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism 22-46, 88-128 (2005). 
6. See id. at xx-xxiii, 25-26. 
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invoking a USA PATRIOT Act provision authorizing preventive detention of 
foreign nationals suspected of terrorist ties,7 the executive branch implemented 
far-reaching preventive detention by employing preexisting immigration law, 
the material witness statute, pretextual prosecution, and an asserted power to 
detain “enemy combatants.”8 When human-rights advocates focus exclusively 
on the “Guantánamo question,” they risk ignoring the problems posed by 
existing preventive-detention laws. 
Preventive detention is in fact an established part of U.S. law. Federal and 
state statutes authorize preventive detention of those facing trial on criminal or 
immigration charges, and of those whose mental disabilities warrant civil 
commitment. All juvenile detention is, at least in theory, preventive rather than 
punitive. As Paul Robinson has shown, criminal sentencing often includes 
substantial preventive considerations, such as when a court gives different 
sentences to two persons convicted of the same offense because it predicts one 
will be more dangerous in the future.9 In reality, then, preventive detention is 
already an integral feature of the American legal landscape. 
The proper question, therefore, is not whether the United States should 
authorize preventive detention—it is already authorized—but how and under 
what circumstances it should be authorized. In particular, is there a case for 
preventive detention of persons suspected of terrorism beyond the preventive-
detention authorities that already exist? Are existing preventive-detention 
authorities appropriately calibrated to distinguish between those who truly need 
to be detained preventively, and those who do not? Should different rules apply 
in light of the potentially catastrophic harms posed by twenty-first century 
terrorists? Should special rules apply to al Qaeda, a terrorist organization that 
has declared war on the United States and attacked us here and abroad, against 
whom Congress has authorized a military response, and with whom the United 
States is in an ongoing military conflict in Afghanistan? If preventive detention 
is permissible under some circumstances, what are the appropriate substantive 
and procedural safeguards that should accompany it? These are some of the 
most difficult and controversial legal questions of the day. 
“Just say no” is not a realistic response. Unlike torture, which is 
universally condemned without exceptions as a matter of international law, the 
question of preventive detention is not susceptible to absolute answers. The 
prevalence of preventive-detention authorities in other countries, as well as in 
the United States, demonstrates this fact. Moreover, if those concerned about 
human rights and the rule of law insist that there is no place for detention of 
 
7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 § 312, 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a) 
(2006). 
8. See Cole, supra note 5. 
9. See Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive 
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001). 
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combatants in an armed conflict with foes such as al Qaeda or the Taliban, their 
arguments may have the perverse effect of encouraging states to use lethal 
force, or to seek to act outside the law without even the safeguards that 
accompany wartime detention. 
At the same time, there are three important reasons to be deeply skeptical 
of preventive-detention regimes. First, preventive detention rests on a 
prediction about future behavior, and no one can predict the future. Decision 
makers all too often fall back on stereotypes and prejudices as proxies for 
dangerousness. Humility about our predictive abilities should counsel against 
preventive detention. Preventing terrorist attacks is a legitimate social goal, of 
course, but there are many ways to do so short of detention, such as securing 
borders, enhancing intelligence gathering, safeguarding nuclear stockpiles, and 
developing smarter foreign policy. Locking up human beings is one of the most 
extreme preventive measures a state can undertake; it should be reserved for 
situations where it is truly necessary. 
Second, the risk of unnecessarily detaining innocent people is high, 
because decision makers are likely to err on the side of detention. When a judge 
releases an individual who in fact poses a real danger of future harm, and the 
individual goes on to inflict that harm, the error will be emblazoned across the 
front pages. When, by contrast, a judge detains an individual who would not 
have committed any wrong had he been released, that error is invisible—and, 
indeed, unknowable. How can one prove what someone would or would not 
have done had he been free? Thus, the visibility of release errors and the 
invisibility of erroneous detentions will lead judges to err on the side of custody 
over liberty. 
Third, preventive detention is inconsistent with basic notions of human 
autonomy and free will. We generally presume that individuals have a choice to 
conform their conduct to the law. Thus, we do not criminalize thought or 
intentions, but only actions. Respect for autonomy requires us to presume, 
absent a very strong showing, that individuals will conform their behavior to 
the law. To lock up a human being on the prediction that he will undertake 
dangerous and illegal action if left free is, in an important sense, to deny his 
autonomy.10 
Thus, any consideration of preventive detention should begin with a 
strong presumption that society should deal with dangerous people through 
criminal prosecution and punishment, not preventive detention. We prohibit 
harmful conduct (including conspiracy to engage in such conduct), give notice 
that those who violate the prohibitions will be punished, and then hold 
responsible those who can be shown, in a fair trial, to have engaged in such 
 
10. I am indebted to Alec Walen for this insight. See Alec D. Walen, Crossing a Moral 
Line: Long-Term Preventive Detention in the War on Terror, 28 Phil. & Pub. Pol’y Q. 15 
(2008).   
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activity. Given the dangers of preventive detention, we should depart from this 
model only where the criminal process cannot adequately address a particularly 
serious threat. 
While it is not always explicitly rationalized in such terms, constitutional 
doctrine governing preventive detention is best understood as reflecting a 
strong presumption that the criminal process is the preferred means for 
addressing socially dangerous behavior. As the Supreme Court has said, “‘in 
our society, liberty is the norm,’ and detention without trial ‘is the carefully 
limited exception.’”11 The exceptions largely arise where criminal prosecution 
is not a viable option for addressing a serious threat to public safety. For 
example, civil commitment of mentally disabled persons who pose a danger to 
the community but lack the requisite intent to conform their conduct to the law 
is justified, in part, because these individuals cannot be held culpable in a 
criminal prosecution. Similarly, because the adjudication of criminal liability 
and immigration status cannot be performed instantaneously, federal law 
authorizes detention without bail of persons facing criminal trial or deportation 
where they pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight. Quarantines of 
persons with infectious disease similarly fit this model; we cannot make it a 
crime to have a disease, and therefore quarantines protect the community from 
a danger that the criminal justice system cannot adequately address. 
Preventive detention of prisoners of war in an international armed conflict 
can be understood in much the same way. The criminal justice system cannot 
address the problem of enemy soldiers for at least three reasons. First, under the 
laws of war, the enemy’s soldiers are “privileged” to fight, which means that 
nations may not criminalize fighting for the other side absent the commission 
of specified “war crimes.”12 Second, enemy soldiers cannot be expected to 
conform their actions to the capturing nation’s laws by avoiding combat if they 
are released; they have no obligation to obey a hostile nation’s laws, and are 
generally compelled to fight by their own country’s laws. Finally, problems of 
proof regarding battlefield captures and the need to incapacitate the enemy 
while preserving military secrets mean that the criminal justice system may 
prove inadequate even where criminal prosecution is a legal possibility. In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that persons captured on the 
battlefield fighting for the Taliban could be preventively detained as “enemy 
combatants” because that authority is a fundamental incident of warfare.13 
Controversy has raged ever since regarding the appropriate scope of that 
 
11. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739 (1987)). 
12. Robert K. Goldman & Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the 
Hostilities in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human 
Rights Law, ASIL Task Force on Terrorism Papers (Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law) Task Force on 
Terrorism, Dec. 2002, at 2, available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf. 
13. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 51719. 
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authority.14 
In short, preventive detention should be limited to situations that cannot 
be adequately addressed through the criminal justice system. The post-9/11 
roundups of thousands of persons with no proven ties to terrorism15 reveal the 
need for reform aimed at restricting the use of sub rosa or de facto preventive-
detention powers. At the same time, the longstanding and still unresolved 
dispute over the scope of “enemy combatant” detention—in addition to 
fundamental separation-of-powers concerns—suggests that a statute expressly 
addressing that issue is necessary. This Article argues that comprehensive 
reform is necessary and should be guided by the constitutionally founded 
principle that any preventive-detention regime must be predicated on a showing 
that criminal prosecution cannot adequately address a serious problem of 
dangerousness. Part I will briefly describe the existing statutory authorities that 
the government used—and in many instances misused—to effectuate 
preventive detention after 9/11. The laws in question include immigration law, 
the material witness statute, broad criminal statutes penalizing material support 
of terrorist groups, and the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) 
against al Qaeda, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to authorize 
detention of at least some “enemy combatants.”16 The government used each of 
these measures to achieve preventive detention in the absence of a law 
expressly authorizing detention of suspected terrorists or al Qaeda fighters. In 
many instances, the government has exploited these laws for purposes they 
were not designed to serve. 
Part II will address the constitutional principles that should govern 
preventive detention. Preventive detention implicates fundamental rights under 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Suspension Clause. I will argue that 
together, these provisions reflect a presumptive constitutional obligation to 
address dangerous conduct through criminal prosecution, conviction, and 
incarceration. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has struck down preventive-
detention laws that are triggered by proof of dangerousness alone.17 In most 
settings where the Court has upheld preventive detention, criminal prosecution 
and incarceration cannot adequately address a particular danger to the 
community. As a constitutional matter, then, preventive detention should be 
tolerated only in those rare circumstances where dangerous behavior cannot be 
addressed through the criminal justice system. 
Part III applies the above principle by proposing a set of specific reforms 
 
14. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (addressing whether 
enemy-combatant authority extended to a foreign national lawfully residing in the United States, 
who allegedly was associated with al Qaeda and had come to the United States to commit terrorist 
acts), vacated as moot, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 2009 WL 564940 (Mar. 6, 2009).  
15. See Cole, supra note 5, at xx-xxiii, 25-26.  
16. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-19. 
17. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 84-88 (1992). 
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designed to forestall the kinds of preventive-detention abuses that followed 
9/11. If preventive detention is to be reserved for situations where it is truly 
needed, existing laws must be tightened. As it currently stands, federal law 
permits preventive detention of persons who have not been shown to pose a 
serious future danger. The reforms would include: conforming standards for 
detention under immigration law to detention standards under criminal law; 
restricting the time that individuals may be detained as material witnesses to 
ensure that this authority is used solely to obtain testimony; narrowing the 
sweeping criminal laws that penalize material support to terrorist groups and 
that have become proxies for preventive detention; and reshaping the largely ad 
hoc and poorly defined authority to detain “enemy combatants.” With respect 
to the latter category of “enemy combatants,” I contend that to be 
constitutional, any preventive-detention regime must closely conform to the 
traditional model of military detention of prisoners of war—and not be 
predicated on the much broader and more malleable concept of “suspected 
terrorists.” Terrorism should remain a matter of criminal prosecution, and 
preventive detention should be authorized only where we are engaged in an 
ongoing armed conflict. But when we are so engaged, there is no reason why 
we should not have recourse to the preventive military detention that has 
historically been recognized as appropriate during wartime. 
I also explore whether the U.S. Constitution affords a legitimate basis for 
short-term preventive detention of suspected terrorists wholly apart from the 
authority to detain “enemy combatants.” In my view, there has been no 
showing that such a law is needed, as the criminal process already authorizes 
short-term preventive detention of those as to whom the government has shown 
probable cause of terrorist activity. If authorities cannot show probable cause 
that a person is engaging or has engaged in a crime, they should not be using 
preventive detention outside the circumscribed military setting. If authorities 
can show probable cause, the tools are already available to hold an individual 
pending the outcome of the criminal or immigration case against him.   
I conclude with some questions about whether a de facto or de jure 
preventive detention regime is ultimately preferable. This is, in fact, the real 
choice we must make when it comes to preventive detention. Advocates on 
both sides of the issue too often fail to acknowledge that the government 
already has substantial preventive-detention authority, and has shown its ability 
and willingness to use it. The question is whether the United States should 
maintain a system that pretends to bar preventive detention, but in reality 
allows it as an implicit and de facto matter, or whether it should acknowledge 
candidly that preventive detention has a limited but appropriate place in liberal 
democracies, and then carefully circumscribe the authority to ensure that it is 
no broader than necessary. In my view, the latter approach is more likely both 
to provide society with the protection it needs and to reduce the number of 
people unnecessarily detained. 
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I 
EXISTING STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
A. Types of De Facto Preventive Detention 
The debate over whether the United States should adopt a preventive-
detention law often proceeds as if preventive detention is not already a part of 
the fabric of American law. In fact, existing federal and state laws already 
authorize preventive detention of persons accused of criminal or immigration 
violations and awaiting trial or removal; persons with information relevant to a 
grand jury investigation or criminal trial who are unlikely to appear to testify if 
served with a subpoena; convicted sex offenders who have completed their 
criminal sentences but pose a continuing risk of recidivism; persons with a 
mental abnormality who pose a risk to themselves or others; nationals of a 
country with which we are in a declared war; and “enemy combatants” fighting 
for the enemy in a military conflict. 
The most common form of preventive detention is of persons formally 
accused of violating criminal or immigration law. Under the Bail Reform Act, a 
judge may deny bail and keep a criminal defendant detained pending trial if he 
poses either a risk of flight or a danger to others.18 The detention is preventive 
because it is imposed not to punish the individual, who remains innocent until 
proven guilty, but to ensure his presence at trial or to protect the community 
from danger in the meantime. Similarly, when an individual has been charged 
with an immigration violation, she may be preventively detained pending 
resolution of the proceedings if there is a risk that she will flee or pose a danger 
to others in the interim.19 
There are three important constraints on these forms of preventive 
detention. First, they apply only to persons charged with violation of criminal 
or immigration law. Second, the detention is temporally limited—it ends once 
the criminal trial concludes, or once a foreign national is either removed or 
determined to be not subject to removal.20 Third, these forms of preventive 
detention generally require an individualized hearing in which the government 
bears the burden of demonstrating that the individual poses a danger that 
warrants his detention.21 
The material witness statute authorizes another form of preventive 
detention.22 If the government establishes reason to believe that an individual 
 
18. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (2006). 
19. See 8 C.F.R. § 236 (2008). 
20. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that foreign nationals ordered 
deported who cannot in fact be removed must be released from custody). 
21. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding preventive detention 
pending criminal trial where government shows by “clear and convincing evidence” that 
defendant poses a danger to the community if released). 
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
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has testimony relevant to a grand jury proceeding or a criminal trial, but would 
likely flee if served with a subpoena, a federal court may authorize detention of 
the individual as a “material witness” in order to ensure his presence at the 
grand jury or criminal trial.23 The detention is imposed not on the basis of any 
past or ongoing violation of law, but to prevent the individual from a future 
evasion of his societal obligation to testify. Detention under this statute is 
limited in time to that necessary to obtain the individual’s testimony, and 
requires individualized proof that the individual is indeed likely to flee if served 
with a subpoena.24 
Some states also authorize preventive detention of individuals who have 
been convicted of sex offenses and have fully served their sentences but have a 
mental disability and pose a risk of repeat offending.25 This is a form of civil 
commitment, which the Supreme Court has upheld for persons who have a 
mental disability that renders them unable to conform their conduct to the law 
and dangerous to themselves or others.26 Individualized showings of disability 
and danger are required, as are fair and regular procedures for judicial review.27 
Two forms of preventive detention are authorized only during wartime. 
The laws of war have long authorized detention of those fighting for the enemy 
in a military conflict. Pointing to this authority, the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld held that a Congressional authorization to use military force 
authorized, as an incident to military force, detention of even U.S. citizens 
captured on the battlefield fighting for the enemy.28 Under the laws of war, this 
authority extends only to persons actually fighting for the enemy, and therefore 
also requires an individualized determination that the individual in question 
falls into that category.29 The tribunals that make those determinations are 
generally comprised of military officials.30 
In addition, the Enemy Alien Act, enacted in 1798 as part of the Alien and 
Sedition Acts and still part of the U.S. Code today, authorizes the detention of 
anyone who is a national of a country with which we are engaged in a declared 
war.31 Under this statute, there need be no determination that an individual is 
fighting for the enemy, is likely to engage in sabotage or espionage, or is 
 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Varner v. Monohan, 460 F.3d 861 
(7th Cir. 2006); see also David J. Gottlieb, Essay, Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders, 50 Kan. 
L. Rev. 1031 (2002); Meagan Kelly, Note, Lock Them Up—And Throw Away the Key: The 
Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in the United States and Germany, 39 Geo. J. Int’l L. 551 
(2008). 
26. See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
27. Id. at 357. 
28. 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004). 
29. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 5, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. 
30. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Military Tribunals and Presidential Power (2005). 
31. 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). 
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hostile to the United States.32 The law presumes that any national of a country 
with which we are at war poses a potential danger and does not require any 
individualized determination beyond ensuring that the individual in question is 
in fact a national of the enemy country. 
Since shortly after 9/11, federal law has also contained a preventive-
detention statute that has never been employed, and therefore never judicially 
tested. Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes the Attorney General 
to detain foreign nationals he certifies as terrorist suspects without a hearing 
and without a showing that they pose a danger or a flight risk.33 They can be 
held for seven days without any charges, and after being charged, can 
apparently be held indefinitely in some circumstances, even if they prevail in 
their removal proceedings by obtaining “relief from removal.”34 The Attorney 
General need only certify that he has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
individual is “described in” various antiterrorism provisions of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA), which are in turn extremely expansive.35 The statute 
does provide for immediate habeas corpus review of the detention,36 and 
perhaps for that reason, the government has yet to invoke this authority. 
As a practical matter, the Constitution’s Suspension Clause also implies a 
de facto preventive-detention authority in very limited circumstances. It 
guarantees the right of detained persons to seek judicial review of the legality 
of their detention, but also provides that in “times of Rebellion or Invasion,” 
where public safety requires it, Congress may suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus.37 While this provision does not authorize preventive detention as such, 
it acknowledges Congress’s power to suspend habeas corpus, which would as a 
practical matter remove the recourse that a detainee would otherwise have to 
the courts to challenge his detention. Because suspension has so rarely been 
invoked, this Article will not address the powers of Congress or the executive 
under the Suspension Clause, but will instead consider what sorts of 
preventive-detention regimes might be permissible or advisable in the absence 
of the extraordinary act of suspending the writ. 
Still, the Suspension Clause is significant for this discussion in at least 
two ways. On the one hand, it underscores that preventive detention is not 
necessarily anathema to our constitutional democracy, at least where limited to 
extraordinary emergencies. On the other hand, the presence of suspension as a 
 
32. Id. 
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a) (2006). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. The INA’s antiterrorism provisions include persons who are mere members of 
designated “terrorist organizations,” persons who have supported only the lawful activities of such 
organizations, and persons who have used, or threatened to use, any weapon with intent to 
endanger person or property, regardless of whether the activity has any connection to terrorism as 
it is generally understood. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V), (iii)(V)(b) (2006). 
36. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a) (2006). 
37. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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kind of safety valve undermines arguments in favor of a freestanding 
preventive-detention statute for ordinary times because the Constitution already 
acknowledges the possibility of preventive detention in true emergency 
situations. 
Finally, while it does not formally fit within the technical definition of 
preventive detention, the expansion of criminal laws is another way in which 
governments may implement a kind of de facto preventive detention. 
Preventive detention is ordinarily defined as distinct from punitive criminal 
incarceration, but if the criminal law is written broadly enough, it may become 
a tool for de facto preventive detention. For example, the federal government 
after 9/11 aggressively prosecuted individuals under material-support statutes 
that, at least as the Bush administration interpreted them, permit the 
prosecution of persons who have never engaged in terrorism, aided or abetted 
terrorism, conspired to engage in terrorism, or provided any support to 
terrorism.38 Under this interpretation, the prosecution need only prove that an 
individual provided something of value to a group that the government has 
designated as terrorist, even if there is no connection shown between the 
support provided and terrorism, and no intent to further terrorist activity.39 
These laws amount to little more than guilt by association, as they effectively 
punish the individual not for his own terrorist acts, nor for any terrorist acts that 
he has supported, but for his support of a group that has been labeled 
“terrorist.” Here, the state punishes and incarcerates the defendant not so much 
because he did anything harmful in the past, but because it fears that he, or the 
group he supports, may do harm in the future. 
B. Abuses of Preventive-Detention Authorities 
The Bush administration used many of the above authorities to effectuate 
widespread preventive detention, at home and abroad, after 9/11. But it also 
abused these authorities by detaining persons as to whom it appears to have had 
little or no basis for concern. For example, it has admitted to using immigration 
laws to preventively detain more than 5,000 foreign nationals, nearly all of 
 
38. See, e.g., David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the Paradigm of 
Prevention in the ‘War on Terror’, in Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge (Andrea 
Bianchi & Alexis Keller eds., 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262792; Michael E. Deutsch & Erica 
Thompson, Secrets and Lies: The Persecution of Muhammad Salah (Part I), 37 J. Palestine 
Stud. 38, 41 (2008). 
39. See Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Offenses: 
Conviction and Sentencing Data in Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and “Data-Reliability” 
Critiques, 11 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 851, 855 (2007) (observing that “the statute does not 
require any showing of personal dangerousness on the part of the defendant; in the paradigmatic 
case, the defendant provides money, equipment, or services to other individuals”); see also 18 
U.S.C. § 2339a(b)(1) (2006) (broadly defining material support to mean “any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service”). 
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whom were Arab or Muslim, in the first two years after 9/11.40 Especially in 
the first several months, the government often detained individuals without 
evidence that they posed any danger and without charging them with any 
immigration violations.41 Where it lacked evidence to justify detention, it 
sought to delay bond hearings that might have led to release orders.42 It kept 
foreign nationals in detention even after immigration judges ordered them 
released.43 And it kept foreign nationals in custody on immigration pretexts 
even after their immigration cases were fully resolved and there was no longer 
any need to detain them to ensure their removal.44 Not one of the more than 
5,000 detained foreign nationals was convicted of a terrorist offense.45 
In addition, the Bush administration employed the material witness law to 
detain suspects for investigation on less than probable cause.46 In many 
instances, it never called its material-witness detainees to testify47—the only 
legitimate reason for a material-witness detention in the first place. The 
government presumably found the material-witness law attractive because it 
permits detention on a showing that an individual merely may have information 
relevant to a criminal investigation,48 a much lower threshold than probable 
cause that the individual has engaged in wrongdoing. 
The Bush administration also aggressively prosecuted individuals under 
material-support laws. In one case, it argued that running a website that 
featured links to other websites that in turn contained jihadist rhetoric 
constituted material support for terrorism.49 In another, it argued that members 
of a Muslim charity had violated the material support statute not by providing 
aid to a designated terrorist group, but by providing humanitarian assistance to 
local “zakat committees” in the West Bank and Gaza that the members of the 
charity should have known were connected to a designated terrorist group, even 
though the United States itself had never designated any of the “zakat 
 
40. See Cole, supra note 5, at 25-26. 
41. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Inspector Gen., The September 11 
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in 
Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks (2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/detainees.pdf [hereinafter OIG Report]. 
42. See id. at 78-80. 
43. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307 (JG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 
(E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006) (describing extended INS detention of Arab and Muslim foreign 
nationals to whom judges had granted “voluntary departure”).  
44. See OIG Report, supra note 41, at 78-80. 
45. See David Cole & Jules Lobel, Are We Safer?, L.A. Times, Nov. 18, 2007, at M4; see 
also Cole, supra note 5, at xx-xxiii, 25-26. 
46. Human Rights Watch, Witness to Abuse 1 (2005), available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/. 
47. Id. at 2. 
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
49. See United States v. Al-Hussayen, No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
29793 (D. Idaho Apr. 7, 2004). 
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committees” as terrorist.50 In still another case, the Bush administration argued 
that providing humanitarian aid to Hamas, before there was any law on the 
books designating Hamas as terrorist or criminalizing support to it, was a crime 
under RICO.51 In none of these cases did prosecutors offer any evidence that 
the defendants had in fact provided aid to terrorist or violent acts. Most of the 
convictions on “terrorism” charges since 9/11 have been under the material-
support statute, which requires no proof that support was intended to further 
terrorist activity.52 In some cases, there may have been reason to suspect that 
the defendants intended to support terrorist activity, but the statute itself has 
been interpreted to require no such proof, and therefore juries need find no such 
evidence to convict.53 
Finally, the Bush administration cited the AUMF and its own executive 
power as authority to detain anyone it declared an “enemy combatant”—
whether captured at home or abroad.54 It initially held them incommunicado 
and denied them any hearings whatsoever,55 and it subjected them to cruel and 
inhuman coercive interrogation, and in some instances, torture.56 While the 
Bush administration initially described all those it held at Guantánamo as the 
“worst of the worst,”57 it subsequently released more than 500 of them, 
 
50. See Gretel C. Kovach, Five Convicted in Terror Financing Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 
2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/25/us/25charity.html?hp. A previous 
trial had concluded in acquittal of one man and hung jury on all other counts. See David Cole, 
Anti-Terrorism on Trial, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 2007, at A19, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/23/AR2007102301805.html. 
51. See United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
52. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006); see David Cole & Jules Lobel, Less Safe, Less Free 
109-16 (2007). 
53. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007), 
amended by 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that material-support statute violates 
due process because it fails to require proof of specific intent to further a group’s illegal 
activities). 
54. See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 221 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing the 
government’s argument that either the AUMF or the President’s inherent constitutional powers 
permit detention), vacated as moot, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 2009 WL 564940 (Mar. 6, 2009). 
55. See Forsaken at Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 2003, at A24, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E1DF153EF931A25750C0A9659C8B63&s
cp=1. 
56. See Philippe Sands, Torture Team (2008) (recounting coercive interrogation policy 
implemented at Guantánamo); Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Finds Detainee Abuse in Guantánamo, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 2004, at A1, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E1DE113EF933A05752C1A9629C8B63; 
Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, Wash. Post, Jan. 14, 2009, at A1 
(reporting that Susan Crawford, top administration official in charge of Guantánamo war-crimes 
prosecutions, concluded that a Guantánamo detainee, Mohammed al-Qahtani had been tortured), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/ 
AR2009011303372.html?hpid=topnews. 
57. Ken Ballen & Peter Bergen, The Worst of the Worst?, Foreign Pol’y, Oct. 2008, 
available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4535 (quoting Donald 
Rumsfeld). 
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suggesting that they might not have been so dangerous after all.58 Of the more 
than 500 released, the Pentagon claimed in January 2009 that 61 had returned 
to terrorism, a figure disputed by others as unfounded.59 
As this overview demonstrates, existing law gives the government 
substantial options for detaining those whom it suspects of terrorist activity. At 
the same time, it also shows that existing authorities are susceptible to abuse 
and already afford the government too much unchecked power to detain. 
Within the United States alone, thousands of people were detained who posed 
no demonstrable threat. Accordingly, if reform is necessary, it should start by 
seeking to correct for the abuses evident in the wake of 9/11. While concerns 
about the need for preventive detention often rest on hypothetical scenarios, the 
case for reform of existing laws is supported by actual experience. 
II 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution itself neither expressly forbids nor expressly authorizes 
preventive detention. The Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence reflects 
a healthy skepticism on the subject, tempered by the pragmatic 
acknowledgment that the criminal justice system cannot adequately address all 
of the dangers that individuals may pose to society, and that therefore 
preventive detention, narrowly confined, is sometimes appropriate. 
The constitutionality of preventive detention is a critically important 
subject, as the power to detain human beings is one of the most awesome 
authorities exercised by a sovereign. If that power is unchecked, it matters little 
what other rights are guaranteed on paper. If people have the right to speak 
freely, for example, but the government has the power to lock them up without 
legal justification, fair procedure, or access to court, then the right to speak 
 
58. See Office of Assistant Sec’y of Def., U.S. Dep’t of Def., News Release No. 
1017-08, Detainee Transfer Announced (2008) (reporting that 525 detainees had been 
transferred or released), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/ 
release.aspx?releaseid=12449; David Bowker & David Kaye, Guantánamo by the Numbers, N.Y. 
Times, Nov. 10, 2007, at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/10/ 
opinion/10kayeintro.html. 
59.  See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., RELEASED GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES AND THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: PROPAGANDA BY THE NUMBERS? 2, 9-15 (2009), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/propaganda_numbers_11509.pdf (showing 
vast inconsistencies in numbers Pentagon has reported as having returned to battle upon release 
from custody); David Morgan, Pentagon: 61 Ex-Guantánamo Inmates Return to Terrorism, 
REUTERS, Jan. 13, 2009; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Later Terror Link Cited for 1 in 7 Freed 
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2009, at A1 (reporting on an undisclosed Pentagon report 
indicating that 74 released Guantánamo detainees had engaged in terrorist or militant activities, 
but noting that the report declines to identify most of the detainees, alleges only associations with 
respect to others, and that most of its allegations could not be independently verified); cf. Shayana 
Kadidal, The Myth of Return to the Battlefield from Guantanamo, HUFFINGTON POST, May 21, 
2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shayana-kadidal/the-mth-of-return-to-
the_b_206603.html (critiquing Bumiller’s report). 
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freely cannot for all practical purposes be guaranteed. In this sense, due process 
and habeas corpus are the sina qua non not only of all other rights, but of the 
very idea of limited government. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan said, “If 
I had to choose between living in a country with habeas corpus but without free 
elections, or a country with free elections but without habeas corpus, I would 
choose habeas corpus every time.”60 
In recognition of the importance of checking the government’s detention 
power, the Constitution restricts that power through the Due Process Clause, 
the Suspension Clause, and the Fourth Amendment. As the Supreme Court has 
noted, “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, 
or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due 
Process] Clause protects.”61 The writ of habeas corpus, a preexisting common 
law right to challenge the legality of detention in court, was given 
constitutional status by the Suspension Clause, which guarantees recourse to 
the writ except in the most extreme circumstances—when Congress determines 
in the face of a rebellion or invasion that the public safety necessitates 
suspension.62 The Fourth Amendment also restricts official detention, for it 
requires that all seizures (including arrests) be reasonable, and generally 
provides that an arrest is not reasonable unless based on probable cause. 
A. Due Process 
Most of the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning preventive detention 
have addressed the issue through the lens of due process. In a 2001 decision 
surveying the landscape and articulating the constitutional preference for 
criminal prosecution of socially dangerous behavior, the Supreme Court stated 
that “government detention violates th[e Due Process] Clause” unless it is 
imposed as punishment in a criminal proceeding conforming to the rigorous 
procedures constitutionally required for such proceedings, or “in certain special 
and ‘narrow’ non-punitive ‘circumstances.’”63 Nonpunitive, or preventive, 
detention has been upheld only where an individual (1) is either in criminal or 
 
60. 145 Cong. Rec. 924 (1999) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). 
61. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
62. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its historical core, the writ of habeas 
corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that 
context that its protections have been strongest.” (footnote omitted)); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 
U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The historic purpose of the writ [of habeas 
corpus] has been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.” (footnote 
omitted)). The roots of the right not to be detained unlawfully extend back beyond the 
Constitution. William Blackstone characterized as an absolute right “the personal liberty of 
individuals . . . without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law.” 1 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *134 (footnote omitted). He also stated that “to refuse or to delay 
to bail any person bailable is an offence against the liberty of the subject . . . by the common law, 
as well as by the statute and the habeas corpus act.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
*297 (citations and footnote omitted).  
63. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 
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immigration proceedings and has been shown to be a danger to the community 
or flight risk;64 (2) is dangerous because of a “harm-threatening mental illness” 
that impairs his ability to control his dangerousness;65 or (3) is an “enemy 
alien” or “enemy combatant” in wartime.66 
Three general principles are common to all of the preventive-detention 
regimes that the Court has upheld. First, the purpose and character of the 
detention must not be punitive; punishment requires a criminal trial. This 
principle of “nonpunitiveness” assumes that where the government seeks to 
address dangerous conduct by depriving individuals of their liberty, criminal 
punishment is the first and presumptive line of defense. Only where 
punishment through the criminal justice system cannot address the problem is 
preventive detention warranted. 
Second, the detention must be temporally limited. Indefinite detention is 
an especially drastic measure, and accordingly most preventive-detention 
regimes that have been upheld have an articulable endpoint—for example, a 
trial, deportation, treatment of a mental disability, or termination of a military 
conflict. The endpoint need not be a specific date, but there must be a 
conceptual terminating point to the detention. When individuals are detained 
pending criminal trial or deportation proceedings, the conclusion of the legal 
process marks a clear end to their preventive detention. In a criminal trial, the 
defendant will either be acquitted and set free, or convicted and then 
imprisoned for punitive rather than preventive ends. Similarly, a deportation 
proceeding will result either in a determination that the individual is not 
deportable, in which case she will be freed, or in an order of removal, which 
must be executed in a reasonable period of time or the individual must be 
released. In civil commitment settings, if the mental illness that is a predicate 
for the commitment is successfully treated, or if the individual no longer poses 
a danger, he must be released. Finally, prisoners of war must be released when 
the necessity created by the military conflict comes to a close, either because 
the war ends or because as individuals they no longer pose a threat to return to 
battle. 
Third, with narrow and questionable exceptions, the justification for 
detention must be particularized to the individual, and generally requires 
probable cause of some past wrongdoing as well as proof of some future danger 
or risk warranting prevention. Just as the state cannot impose criminal sanctions 
 
64. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (finding the Bail 
Reform Act constitutional because it authorizes pretrial detention based on danger to the 
community and acknowledging bail’s traditional use against flight); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 
524, 541 (1952) (holding executive could detain violent immigrants pending the outcome of 
deportation proceedings). 
65. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002); 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997). 
66. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 
160 (1948). 
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on individuals absent a determination of individual culpability,67 it cannot lock 
up a person absent a demonstrated need to lock up that specific person.68 
The Bail Reform Act illustrates these principles. In United States v. 
Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s authorization of preventive 
pretrial detention for dangerous criminal defendants against a due process 
challenge.69 The Court emphasized that the statute authorized detention only 
for preventive purposes, only for a limited period of (pretrial) time, and only 
upon a showing both of individualized probable cause for arrest, and of clear 
and convincing evidence that no release conditions “‘will reasonably assure . . . 
the safety of any other person and the community.’”70 Denial of bail to 
dangerous arrestees pending trial did not constitute punishment, the Court 
reasoned, because it served a legitimate nonpunitive interest in protecting the 
community and was not excessive in light of that interest.71 If the government’s 
interests could be addressed through criminal prosecution, then detention 
without trial would be excessive, and therefore would violate substantive due 
process. Because it necessarily takes time to bring a case to trial, criminal 
conviction and punishment cannot address the danger that a defendant will flee 
or commit further harm pending trial. 
The Court also held that the Bail Reform Act’s “extensive safeguards” 
satisfied procedural due process.72 The safeguards included the rights to 
counsel, to testify, to proffer evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses.73 In 
addition, the government was obliged to prove the need for detention by clear 
and convincing evidence.74 Finally, the statute required that an independent 
judge, guided by “statutorily enumerated factors,” issue a written decision 
subject to “immediate appellate review.”75 
If detention were imposed without an individualized showing of necessity, 
it would be excessive in light of its legitimate purposes, and would violate 
substantive due process. And without safeguards affording the individual a 
meaningful opportunity to defend himself, civil detention would violate 
procedural due process. Thus, Salerno’s reasoning implies that preventive 
 
67. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (civil liability for group 
membership requires a showing of an individual intent to further illegal aims of the group); United 
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264-65 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a statute because it: “quite 
literally establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that an individual's 
association poses the threat feared by the Government in proscribing it”); Scales v. United States, 
367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961) (due process requires showing of individual culpability for criminal 
sanction). 
68. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
69. Id. at 741. 
70. Id.; see also id. at 750-52. 
71. Id. at 747. A detention may be deemed impermissibly punitive not only if it has a 
punitive motive, but also if, even if properly motivated, it is excessive in character. Id. 
72. Id. at 752. 
73. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987). 
74. Id. at 752. 
75. Id. at 751-52. 
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detention in the pretrial-detention context may be imposed only if the criminal-
prosecution model cannot adequately address the state’s compelling interests in 
protecting the community or precluding flight of a criminal defendant, it lasts 
only for a limited period of time, and it includes a fair, individualized 
determination that detention is necessary.76 
Civil commitment, like detention pending trial, also addresses a scenario 
in which criminal prosecution cannot adequately address danger to the 
community. Persons who lack the requisite mental capability to distinguish 
right from wrong or to control their own actions generally cannot be held 
criminally liable. Yet they may pose a serious danger to the community. The 
Court has accordingly upheld civil commitment where an individual is found, 
after a fair adversarial proceeding, to be a danger to himself or others and to 
have a mental illness or abnormality that makes it “‘difficult, if not impossible, 
for the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.’”77 The latter 
showing is particularly essential “lest ‘civil commitment’ become a 
‘mechanism for retribution or general deterrence’—functions properly those of 
criminal law, not civil commitment.”78 
Commitment for dangerousness alone is not constitutionally permitted. In 
Foucha v. Louisiana, the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute that authorized 
civil commitment on a finding of dangerousness without any finding of mental 
illness, stressing that our present system, “with only narrow exceptions and 
aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only those 
who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law.”79 
The civil commitment cases thus underscore that criminal prosecution is, as a 
constitutional matter, the presumptive route for addressing socially dangerous 
behavior, and that preventive detention is permissible only where for some 
reason the criminal process cannot adequately address dangerousness. 
The maxim that civil commitment may not be imposed for purposes of 
retribution or general deterrence also supports the requirement that detention be 
predicated on an individualized showing of need. One might otherwise contend 
 
76. Analogous reasoning supports preventive detention of foreign nationals charged with 
deportation pending the outcome of their proceedings, provided they pose a risk of flight or a 
danger to the community. See David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration 
Detention, 51 Emory L.J. 1003, 1029 (2002); see, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690-91 
(2001). 
77. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346, 358 (1997)). 
78. Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). To the 
same effect, the Crane Court stated that this requirement was designed “to distinguish the 
dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to 
civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal 
case.” Id. at 413. Similarly, in Hendricks, the Court explained that the requirement of a harm-
threatening mental illness “serve[s] to limit involuntary civil commitment to those who suffer 
from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control.” Hendricks, 521 
U.S. at 358. 
79. 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992). 
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that detention of a whole category of persons will have a general deterrent 
effect, eliminating the need to show that each individual’s detention is in fact 
necessary for reasons specific to that individual.80 With those purposes off 
limits, the only legitimate purposes for detention are by definition subject to 
individualized proof, such as protection of the community from dangerous 
persons and avoiding flight from pending criminal or immigration proceedings. 
Civil commitment, unlike pretrial preventive detention, does not formally 
require probable cause that an individual has engaged in criminal conduct. But 
as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely that the government could establish 
that someone posed a sufficient danger to warrant civil commitment without 
proving some past harmful conduct that, but for the individual’s mental illness, 
would amount to probable cause of criminal behavior. Accordingly, the 
prediction about future harm that underlies civil commitment will often require 
proof of past harmful conduct. 
Preventive detention is also permitted in wartime. Here, too, the criminal 
model does not adequately address the state’s legitimate concerns. In a 
traditional armed conflict, the laws of war forbid the state from prosecuting 
enemy soldiers for fighting—conduct that, outside a war setting, would violate 
laws against murder, assault, and the like.81 In addition, a nation cannot 
presume, consistent with respect for individual autonomy, that an enemy 
soldier will desist from fighting against it, because the soldier is under no 
obligation to do so, and on the contrary, is generally required by his own 
country’s laws to fight. Finally, problems of proof are significant, both because 
military forces cannot be expected to gather evidence carefully on the field of 
battle and because the military will frequently have legitimate needs to 
maintain secrecy about what it knows about the opposing forces. Accordingly, 
preventive detention during wartime without criminal charges or a criminal trial 
has long been recognized as legitimate. 
Most recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld the 
detention of a U.S. citizen allegedly captured on the battlefield carrying arms 
and fighting for the Taliban during the military conflict in Afghanistan.82 The 
administration argued that it could hold Hamdi indefinitely as an “enemy 
combatant” without affording him any hearing, on the basis of a hearsay 
 
80. The Bush administration made just that argument to justify detention of asylum seekers 
arriving from Haiti, contending not that any particular individual had to be detained to guard 
against the risk of flight or danger to the community, but that the detention of all Haitian asylum 
seekers would deter Haitians from coming to the United States to seek asylum. D-J-, Resp’t, 23 I. 
& N. Dec. 572, 577 (Att’y Gen 2003) (interim decision). 
81. Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United 
States in the Field (Lieber Code), U.S. War Dep’t General Orders No. 100, § 3, art. 57 
(1863) (“So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of 
fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual crimes or 
offenses.”), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/110?OpenDocument. 
82. 542 U.S. 507, 510-13 (2004). 
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affidavit from a midlevel military official.83 At most, it maintained, habeas 
corpus review should ask only whether the government’s affidavit constituted 
“some evidence” to support the detention,84 an extremely deferential standard 
that precluded any inquiry into whether the affidavit’s assertions were in fact 
true, and that would not involve any evidentiary hearing. 
The Supreme Court recognized that detention under the narrow 
circumstances presented was statutorily authorized and constitutionally 
permissible, but insisted on much more robust procedural guarantees than the 
Bush administration provided. It ruled that detention for the purpose of 
preventing a fighter from returning to battle during a military conflict was 
supported by a long tradition under the laws of war, and was therefore 
authorized as a “fundamental incident” to Congress’s AUMF.85 But it held that 
the government had failed to afford Hamdi adequate procedural protections.86 
Due process required the government to provide Hamdi notice of the factual 
basis for his detention and a meaningful opportunity to contest the 
government’s allegations before an independent adjudicator.87 Thus, even in 
wartime, an individualized showing of need, established in a fundamentally fair 
proceeding, is required if preventive detention is to satisfy due process.88 
B. Fourth Amendment 
While preventive detention has most often been analyzed through the lens 
of due process, the Fourth Amendment also imposes limits on the practice. Its 
requirement that all seizures be “reasonable” has long been interpreted to mean 
that arrests (seizures of the person) generally require a showing of probable 
cause that the arrestee committed a criminal offense.89 Since preventive 
detention requires an initial arrest, probable cause of some past or ongoing 
illegal activity under criminal or immigration law is generally required for 
preventive detention. 
Exceptions to this requirement in the detention setting would generally 
require a finding that a given seizure served special needs, above and beyond 
ordinary law enforcement, and was reasonable.90 The material-witness law 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 527-28. 
85. See id. at 519. 
86. Id. at 529-37. 
87. Id. at 533. 
88. See id. at 523. 
89. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
90. The Court has upheld searches and seizures without probable cause or a warrant where 
the search or seizure scheme serves special needs above and beyond ordinary law enforcement, 
and the scheme is otherwise reasonable. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) 
(upholding sobriety checkpoint on highway where it served special need of highway safety, was 
applied across the board, and involved only a minimally intrusive, brief stop). In assessing 
reasonableness, the Court balances a number of factors, including the intrusiveness of the search, 
the extent to which it is standardized or discretionary, and its effectiveness. Id. 
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authorizes preventive detention without any showing of probable cause of past 
or current criminal activity, and instead requires proof that an individual has 
testimony material to a criminal proceeding and “that it may become 
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.”91 Civil 
commitment does not formally require probable cause of a past crime, although 
as a practical matter it may require something very close. And military 
detention of combatants does not require proof of criminal activity, but does 
require that the individual be a combatant for enemy forces. The Supreme 
Court has not addressed the validity of these measures under the Fourth 
Amendment, but presumably they would be deemed “reasonable” under the 
Fourth Amendment for reasons similar to those outlined under the Due Process 
Clause analysis above. Where the government cannot invoke a special need 
distinct from law enforcement, but is merely engaged in counterterrorism, the 
criminal standard would apply, requiring probable cause for any arrest.   
As a procedural matter, the Fourth Amendment requires either a judicially 
approved warrant in advance of arrest, or, where warrantless arrests are 
permissible,92 that the arrestee be brought before a judge promptly, 
presumptively within forty-eight hours, for a probable cause hearing.93 The 
government may be able to show that a delay of more than forty-eight hours is 
necessary, but the burden rests with the government.94 
There is no reason why these Fourth Amendment protections against 
“unreasonable seizures” ought not to apply to all arrests in the United States, 
including arrests of foreign nationals, and including arrests for preventive 
purposes.95 An arrest for immigration or preventive purposes is just as much a 
“seizure” as an arrest for criminal law enforcement purposes. Thus, any 
preventive detention regime would presumably require some showing of 
individualized suspicion, and prompt access to a court for a determination as to 
whether the government can justify the preventive detention. 
 
91. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
92. The Court permits warrantless arrests where there is probable cause and an arrest takes 
place in public, or where there are exigent circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 
U.S. 411, 417 (1976). 
93. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
94. Id. at 57. 
95. Any substantial restriction on an individual’s freedom of movement is a seizure, and 
requires reasonable suspicion, if it amounts to only a brief investigative stop, Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 27 (1968), or probable cause if it amounts to a custodial arrest. United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983) (seizure of luggage for ninety minutes was not a brief stop, and required 
probable cause); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983) (stop of airline passenger rose to 
level of custodial arrest, and therefore required probable cause). 
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C. Suspension Clause 
The Suspension Clause guarantees the availability of the most important 
practical safeguard against arbitrary detention: judicial review.96 The 
Suspension Clause strictly limits the situations in which habeas corpus may be 
suspended, and guarantees that absent suspension, a detained individual should 
have prompt and effective recourse to a court to challenge the legality of his 
detention. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that this 
constitutional guarantee applied even to foreign nationals held as “enemy 
combatants” at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, outside the United States’ 
borders.97 Boumediene holds that the Suspension Clause establishes a 
constitutionally based source of jurisdiction, subject to restriction only through 
a formal suspension of the writ. Thus, where the Suspension Clause applies (a 
question governed in the extraterritorial setting by a practical consideration of 
multiple factors), any preventive detention regime must include prompt and 
effective access to a court to test the legality of the detention, absent a formal 
suspension of the writ. 
In sum, the Constitution does not forbid preventive detention, but does 
require that any preventive-detention scheme meet four basic requirements: (1) 
it must have a legitimate, nonpunitive purpose that cannot be served through 
the presumptive approach of criminal prosecution; (2) it must be accompanied 
by fair procedures to establish that the individual in fact poses a threat 
sufficient to warrant preventive detention; (3) it must provide for prompt and 
meaningful judicial review, absent suspension of the writ; and (4) it must be 
subject to a definable (if not necessarily definite) endpoint. 
D. Exceptions to the Rule 
Constitutional jurisprudence on preventive detention includes some 
exceptions to the rules set forth above, but these exceptions are of questionable 
validity, and in any event are confined to very particular circumstances. 
In Korematsu v. United States, for example, the Court infamously upheld 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s World War II “Japanese exclusion 
order,” requiring the displacement and ultimate internment of all Japanese 
Americans and Japanese nationals residing on the West Coast.98 The Court’s 
 
96. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
Court, observed that: “Where a person is detained by executive order, rather than . . . after being 
tried and convicted in a court, the need for collateral review is most pressing. A criminal 
conviction in the usual course occurs after a judicial hearing before a tribunal disinterested in the 
outcome and committed to procedures designed to ensure its own independence. These dynamics 
are not inherent in executive detention orders or executive review procedures. In this context the 
need for habeas corpus is more urgent.” Id. at 2269. 
97. Id. 
98. 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). 
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decision focused on equal protection rather than due process, and concluded 
that the need to forestall espionage and sabotage, coupled with the asserted 
inability to identify specific threats on an individualized basis, gave rise to a 
compelling state interest that justified excluding all persons of Japanese descent 
from the West Coast.99 The majority did not expressly address a due process 
challenge, but its reasoning would presumably also support the 
constitutionality, as a matter of due process, of detentions without 
individualized showings of dangerousness. 100 
Korematsu, however, has been thoroughly discredited. The Court has 
never cited it with approval, much less followed it, and every sitting Justice 
who has mentioned it has condemned it.101 Congress ultimately issued a formal 
apology and paid reparations to the Japanese internees,102 and the federal courts 
invalidated the convictions of Korematsu and others for defying the exclusion 
orders.103 Korematsu has little if any precedential value. To the contrary, its 
widespread rejection over time reinforces the principle that individuals should 
be treated as individuals, on their own facts and circumstances, even when 
national security is at stake. 
In World War II, the Court also reviewed a challenge to the detention and 
removal of a German national under the Alien Enemy Act, which authorizes 
the President to detain, deport, or otherwise restrict the liberty of any person 
over fourteen years of age who is a citizen of the country with which the United 
States is at war and has not naturalized as a United States citizen.104 In Ludecke 
v. Watkins, a bare majority upheld the President’s action, but offered little 
reasoning to support its conclusion.105 Instead, it rested almost entirely on 
custom, asserting simply that the Alien Enemy Act was “almost as old as the 
Constitution, and it would savor of doctrinaire audacity now to find the statute 
offensive to some emanation of the Bill of Rights.”106 This is hardly persuasive. 
The law invalidated in Marbury v. Madison was also enacted 
contemporaneously with the Constitution, and that did not protect it from 
invalidation.107 Similarly, laws criminalizing homosexual sex have a long 
 
  99. See id. at 223-24. 
100. See id. at 218-19. 
101. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953, 993 n.165 (2002) (citing 
various cases); see, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (O’Connor, J.) (citing 
dissent in Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233-34 (Murphy, J. dissenting)); Id. at 608 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
102. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (acknowledging 
“fundamental injustice” of internment and ordering restitution for all persons ordered to leave 
their homes). 
103. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1984); 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 603-04 (9th Cir. 1987). 
104. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). 
105. 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948). 
106. Id. at 171 (footnote omitted). 
107. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). When the Court decided Ludecke, the Enemy Aliens 
Act had been on the books for a much longer time than the statute invalidated in Marbury had 
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legacy, yet the Court has held that they violate due process today.108 
In Ludecke, moreover, the President had asserted only the power to deport 
those alien enemies who he specifically determined to pose a danger, and had 
afforded Ludecke a hearing on his specific circumstances.109 The Supreme 
Court has more recently characterized Ludecke as holding that “in times of war 
or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the Government may 
detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous,”110 a 
description that is consistent with a requirement of individualized findings. The 
Alien Enemy Act itself does not require the President to make an individualized 
finding of danger or suspicion,111 but as the law had been implemented in 
Ludecke’s situation such a finding was indeed required.112 Moreover, the 
continuing validity of the Alien Enemy Act has not been tested since Ludecke, 
because the Act applies only in declared wars,113 and the United States has not 
declared war since World War II. 
As with Korematsu, there is reason to doubt that Ludecke remains good 
law. The Ludecke Court employed highly deferential reasoning strikingly 
similar to that used in Korematsu, and strikingly different from that employed 
in Boumediene. Ludecke precedes the development of the Court’s modern due 
process jurisprudence regarding preventive detention, which requires an 
individualized showing of need for detention, even in wartime.114 And the 
Court has warned that the power over the particular category of “enemy aliens” 
should not be extended beyond its unique setting.115 
The only non-wartime Supreme Court decision to uphold preventive 
detention without the procedural safeguards set forth above concerned a statute 
subjecting certain “criminal aliens” to mandatory immigration detention 
pending removal.116 As in Ludecke, the Court in Demore v. Kim split five to 
four. The majority relied on statistical evidence that “criminal aliens”—those 
who had been convicted of crimes that rendered them presumptively 
deportable—were more likely than other foreign nationals to commit additional 
crimes or flee if released on bond.117 And the Court stressed that rules that 
 
been when that case was decided. However, because the Enemy Alien Act is triggered only by 
formally declared wars or invasion, it was only sporadically in force, and the Supreme Court had 
not previously reviewed or applied it. See 50 U.S.C. § 21.   
108. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
109. Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 163-64. 
110. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). 
111. See 50 U.S.C. § 21. 
112. See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 163. 
113. See 50 U.S.C. § 21. 
114. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 524 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (requiring that American 
citizen detained as “enemy combatant” be afforded notice and a meaningful opportunity to 
respond before a neutral decision maker). 
115. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 772 (1950). 
116. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
117. Id. at 521. 
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would be unacceptable if applied to citizens may be permissible in the 
immigration setting.118   
Justice Kennedy, who cast the necessary fifth vote, emphasized in a 
separate concurrence that under the immigration statute, foreign nationals were 
entitled to an individualized hearing if they claimed not to fall within the 
category subject to mandatory detention.119 He further noted that if deportation 
were unreasonably delayed, an individualized showing of dangerousness or 
flight risk would be constitutionally required.120 
The Court’s reasoning in Kim is flawed, as it proffers no good reason for 
discarding the requirement of individualized need before subjecting a human 
being to preventive detention. Its explicit invocation of a double standard, 
allowing the deprivation of liberty of foreign nationals without the due process 
to which citizens would be entitled is especially troubling, as it posited no 
legitimate rationale for differential treatment in this context.121 
At most, then, the Court has upheld preventive detention only three times 
without requiring the usual showing necessary for preventive detention: a fair, 
individualized determination that the detainee poses a threat that cannot be 
addressed through the criminal process. Two of those decisions arose in World 
War II, and may not withstand the test of history. The third is limited to 
temporary preventive detention of a class of foreign nationals who are almost 
certainly removable and have been shown as a class to pose a greater than 
average risk of flight—and even there the crucial fifth vote stressed the 
importance of at least some kind of individualized determination. With the 
exception of these three decisions, the Court has upheld preventive detention 
only where criminal prosecution is inadequate to address a serious danger to the 
community, the need for preventive detention in an individual case has been 
established in a fair, adversarial hearing subject to judicial review, and the 
detention has a definable endpoint. 
Still, the precedents described above leave many unanswered questions. Is 
it ever permissible to detain an individual on grounds of future danger without 
any charge or adjudication of past dangerous conduct or wrongdoing? What 
 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
120. Id. at 531-32 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
121. Great Britain’s Law Lords, by contrast, ruled a post-9/11 law invalid precisely 
because it imposed indefinite preventive detention without charges on foreign nationals suspected 
of terrorist ties and not on British citizens. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 
56, ¶ 73, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 127 (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). It found no difference in the 
threats British and foreign nationals posed, and no difference in their respective interests in being 
free of confinement. Id. The Lords declared the statute incompatible with the European 
Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated in British law by the Human Rights Act of 1998, 
because the statute discriminated unlawfully between British citizens and foreign nationals. Id. 
The European Court of Human Rights subsequently reached the same result, and awarded 
damages to the detainees. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
(2008), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/499d4a1b2.html. 
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burden of proof is required for preventive detention, and does the burden vary 
depending on the length of the detention? When does the Constitution mandate 
that a detainee be afforded access to a lawyer? How should the individual’s 
right to a fair hearing be reconciled with the government’s interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of information relevant to detention? 
In short, the Court’s precedent provides important, albeit limited guidance 
on the constitutionality of a terrorist preventive-detention law. On the one hand, 
the Court has not ruled out preventive detention altogether. On the other, it has 
viewed the practice skeptically, and upheld it only in limited settings, 
principally where the criminal justice system is incapable of addressing the 
government’s legitimate concerns about an individual’s danger or flight risk, 
and where fair procedures are in place to minimize the risk of error. The Court 
has made clear that preventive detention is not permissible for punitive 
purposes or for general deterrence. And it has recognized the legitimacy of 
preventive detention only where an individual is awaiting resolution of formal 
charges that he has violated criminal or immigration law, where an individual 
suffers from a mental disability that renders him dangerous to himself or others, 
or where the laws and customs of war have long recognized the power to detain 
as an incident of engagement in an ongoing military conflict. 
III 
REFORM OF EXISTING LAW 
The history of preventive detention, both before and after 9/11, suggests 
that there is more need for restricting than for expanding its existing scope. The 
United States has survived for more than two hundred years without a 
preventive-detention law directed at terrorists or other serious criminals. 
Proponents of expanded preventive-detention powers have not pointed to a 
single al Qaeda member or other terrorist who had to be released because of the 
lack of adequate existing detention authority. At the same time, thousands of 
persons having nothing to do with terrorism were subject to preventive 
detention in the wake of 9/11. Accordingly, reform of the preventive-detention 
laws must be designed to curtail the abuses. This would require, at a minimum, 
reforms of immigration law, the material witness law, the material support 
statutes, and the enemy-combatant-detention authority. In each instance, the 
proper reform is not elimination of preventive-detention authority, but a 
narrowing of the law to ensure that it is employed only where truly necessary. 
Finally, I will address whether there is a need for a new short-term preventive-
detention statute directed at persons suspected of involvement in imminent 
terrorist attacks. 
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A. Immigration Law 
The vast majority of persons detained in antiterrorism measures in the 
wake of 9/11 were foreign nationals detained pursuant to immigration law.122 
Under that law, if a foreign national is placed into immigration proceedings for 
having allegedly violated the terms of her visa, she may be denied bond and 
held pending resolution of the removal proceeding if she poses a risk of flight 
or a danger to the community.123 This form of preventive detention is 
analogous to that imposed on persons awaiting a criminal trial, and is not 
objectionable in itself. However, this authority was widely abused after 9/11, 
resulting in the detention of many persons without any objective justification 
for their detention.124 
Immigration law should be amended to ensure that preventive detention is 
available on the same terms—and with the same safeguards—as in the criminal 
bail context. The immigrant facing a deportation hearing and the criminal 
defendant awaiting trial have identical interests in not being arbitrarily deprived 
of their liberty. Similarly, the government has identical interests in detaining 
the immigrant and the criminal defendant if they pose a risk of flight or a 
danger to the community. We treat foreign nationals and citizens awaiting 
criminal trial identically; why should it matter that a foreign national is being 
detained pending an immigration proceeding rather than a criminal trial? There 
is no justification for a double standard here. Accordingly, a statute modeled on 
the Bail Reform Act should be enacted to govern preventive-immigration 
detention. 
In addition to adopting Bail Reform Act procedures and standards, several 
other reforms would be necessary to achieve parity between the treatment of 
foreign nationals in immigration proceedings and defendants in criminal 
proceedings. First, foreign nationals arrested for alleged immigration violations 
should be charged and brought before a judge for a probable cause hearing 
within forty-eight hours of their arrest. Under current immigration rules and 
regulations, foreign nationals can be arrested without charges, and the 
regulations merely require that they be charged within a “reasonable period of 
time” in emergencies.125 That language, introduced by Attorney General John 
Ashcroft in the first weeks after 9/11, ultimately led to hundreds of foreign 
nationals being held for days, weeks, and sometimes even months without 
being charged with any immigration violation.126 A criminal arrest is 
 
122. Cole, supra note 5, at 6-35. 
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2008). 
124. See supra notes 40-45.    
125. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2008). 
126. Amnesty International, United States of America: Amnesty 
International’s Concerns Regarding Post September 11 Detentions in the USA 10-11 
(2002), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/044/2002; Human Rights 
Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights Abuses of Post-September 11 Detainees 50 
(2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2002/us911/. 
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“unreasonable” absent probable cause, found by a judge either before or within 
forty-eight hours after arrest.127 An immigration arrest ought to require the 
same showing and procedure. 
Second, if the government is unable to meet its burden of demonstrating 
that an individual poses a danger to the community or risk of flight, release on 
bond or the individual’s own recognizance should be ordered. The Justice 
Department’s Inspector General found that in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, 
immigration authorities frequently delayed bond hearings solely because they 
had no objective evidence that would justify denying bond, and they did not 
want to risk a hearing that would expose that fact and lead to the individual’s 
release.128 The Bush administration’s official policy was to hold individuals in 
detention until they were “cleared” of any connection to terrorism, and 
government officials exploited immigration law to obtain that result.129 
Third, indigent foreign nationals detained during removal proceedings 
should be entitled to government-provided counsel at least with respect to the 
issue of their detention. Existing immigration law does not entitle indigent 
foreign nationals to receive legal representation at the government’s expense in 
immigration hearings, despite the gravity of such hearings for individuals’ 
lives, and the difficulty of navigating the complex immigration system. The 
kind of justice foreign nationals receive often depends on whether they have 
legal assistance, and on the quality of that assistance.130 Irrespective of whether 
the United States should provide indigent foreign nationals legal assistance for 
removal hearings in general, the government should certainly provide legal 
assistance when it seeks to detain them. Foreign nationals often languish in 
detention for long periods while their cases are pending.131 While detention 
may be necessary for some, appointment of counsel would help to ensure that 
we detain only those who truly need to be detained. Over time, such a reform 
might even save the government money, by saving on the cost of unnecessary 
detentions. 
Fourth, the government should rescind its regulation providing an 
automatic stay of release orders where immigration authorities appeal a grant of 
 
127. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (requiring prompt judicial 
hearing of probable cause, presumptively within forty-eight hours, where individuals are arrested 
without warrant). 
128. See OIG Report, supra note 41, at 76-80. 
129. See id. at 77; Cole, supra note 5, at 26-35; Constitution Project, The Use and 
Abuse of Immigration Authority as a Counterterrorism Tool 6 (2008), available at 
www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Immigration_Authority_As_A_Counterterrorism_Tool.pdf. 
130. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 
60 Stan. L. Rev. 295, 349 (2007) (finding, in 247 immigration asylum hearings from 2000 until 
2004, asylum seekers who received legal assistance were more likely to be granted asylum than 
those who lacked assistance). 
131. See ACLU, Immigrant’s Rights: Detention, Conditions of Confinement in 
Immigration Detention Facilities (2007), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/detention/30261pub20070627.html. 
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release on bond.132 Under this regulation, which Attorney General Ashcroft 
promulgated in the wake of 9/11, the government need not show that it has any 
chance of success on appeal in order to keep a foreign national detained, even 
after an immigration judge has found no basis for detention.133 The mere filing 
of the appeal automatically stays the foreign national’s release for the duration 
of the appeal. Appeals can easily take several months to resolve. Where an 
immigration judge has found no basis for detention, there is no legitimate 
rationale for giving the government a stay without requiring it to show that it is 
likely to succeed on appeal, the showing traditionally required for stays and 
injunctions pending appeal.134 For these reasons, many courts have declared the 
automatic-stay provision unconstitutional.135 
Finally, immigration law should be clarified to make explicit that 
immigration detention must end once removal can be effectuated. After 9/11, 
the government often kept foreign nationals in detention long after they could 
have been released.136 In some instances, individuals admitted that they had 
overstayed their visas and agreed to leave, and immigration judges granted 
“voluntary departure” orders, which provide that the alien is free to leave.137 At 
that point, the only action remaining was for the foreign national to leave the 
country. Yet under the Bush administration’s “hold until cleared” policy, the 
government would not allow the detainee to leave the country until it was 
satisfied that he was not connected to terrorism even where there were no other 
obstacles to his immediate departure.138 Such detention should be unlawful, for 
the only legitimate purpose of an immigration detention is to aid removal. Once 
a person has agreed to leave and can leave, there is no legitimate immigration 
reason to keep him detained any further.139 
 
132. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.19(i)(2) (2008). 
133. Id. 
134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 62. 
135. See Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662, 669 (D.N.J. 2003); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. 
Supp. 2d 842, 846-47 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (D. 
Conn. 2003); Almonte-Vargas v. Elwood, No. 02-CV-2666, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12387 (E.D. 
Pa. June 28, 2002). 
136. OIG Report, supra note 41, at 37-38. 
137. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 5, at 33-34 (discussing Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-
2307 (JG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 2006)). 
138. Id. 
139. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), held that once removal was no longer 
reasonably foreseeable, immigration detention could not be maintained, for the only legitimate 
purpose of immigration detention is to aid removal. In Turkmen v. Ashcroft, a district court 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas as having established a presumptively 
reasonable six-month detention period for foreign nationals under final deportation orders. 
Turkmen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170, at *118. That decision gets Zadvydas backwards. The 
Court in Zadvydas considered whether there were limits on the government’s ability to detain a 
demonstrably dangerous individual where it faced obstacles to his removal. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 
682. It read the statute to give federal authorities six months to attempt to resolve any such 
obstacles, and then required release thereafter if removal was not reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 
701. Thus, in Zadvydas, the six-month statutory period was treated as a constraint on the detention 
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These reforms would place preventive detention in the context of pending 
immigration proceedings on the same footing as preventive detention pending a 
criminal trial. By ensuring that the government must promptly demonstrate that 
detention without bond is actually necessary, such reforms would reduce the 
likelihood that immigration detention is employed unnecessarily to detain 
persons who pose no threat. Preventive detention unquestionably has a place in 
immigration enforcement, but under current law it can too easily be imposed 
without an objective basis—as the aftermath of 9/11 illustrated. 
B. Material Witness Law 
The material witness law140 is designed for a legitimate purpose: to ensure 
that individuals do not evade their civic obligation to provide testimony in a 
criminal investigation or trial by fleeing the jurisdiction. However, because it 
permits detention without probable cause of criminal activity, it is a tempting 
tool for law enforcement authorities who suspect a given individual but lack 
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The law was not designed, 
however, as a catch-all provision to allow detention of suspicious individuals. 
If it were, it would likely be unconstitutional because it would provide an end-
run around the probable cause requirement. 
To forestall abusive invocation of the material-witness law, it should be 
amended to impose a presumptive time limit on detention. It might provide, for 
example, that a material witness must be brought to testify before a grand jury 
within forty-eight hours of his arrest unless the government can show good 
cause for delaying the testimony. In no event should the government be 
permitted to hold an individual for more than a week to procure grand jury 
testimony. There is no reason not to have the detained individual testify 
promptly, especially given the constitutional interest in minimizing nonpunitive 
restrictions on individual liberty. 
When witnesses are held to testify at trial, delay issues are more difficult. 
Fitting an individual’s testimony into a criminal trial will often require more 
flexibility as trials can be lengthy and are frequently delayed or deferred by 
forces beyond the prosecution’s control. But the material-witness law permits a 
judge to order that a material witness’s testimony be taken by videotape 
deposition.141 When delays of more than two weeks are likely, courts should 
require that the witness’s testimony be taken by videotape deposition. Without 
 
of dangerous foreign nationals who could not be removed. In Turkmen¸ the district court 
transformed that limitation into a presumptive authorization of six months of detention even 
where removal could be effectuated immediately. Turkmen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39170, at *31. 
The Turkmen decision is pending on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
(Disclosure: I am co-counsel for plaintiffs in Turkmen v. Ashcroft). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006). 
141. See id. (“No material witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any 
condition of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and 
if further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.”). 
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such time limits, the material witness statute poses too great a temptation to the 
prosecutor who seeks to detain suspicious persons for investigation without 
probable cause of wrongdoing. 
C. Material Support Laws 
We generally conceive of preventive detention as incarceration imposed 
without a criminal conviction. But that conception may be overly formalistic. 
Another way to effectuate preventive detention as a de facto matter is to expand 
criminal liability. In Philip K. Dick’s short story, “Minority Report,” psychics 
predict who will commit crime in the future, and the legislature enacts a “pre-
crime” law that allows the government to arrest and prosecute people before 
they commit their crimes.142 The United States has not gone quite so far, but its 
laws prohibiting “material support” to proscribed “terrorist organizations” 
allow for the prosecution and conviction of individuals based more on what the 
government fears might happen in the future than on the wrongfulness of their 
past conduct. 
The most important of these statutes is 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, enacted as part 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.143 Although 
rarely enforced before 9/11, it has since become a principal tool in the Justice 
Department’s “terrorism” prosecutions.144 The reason is simple: it allows the 
government to obtain a “terrorist” conviction without establishing that an 
individual engaged in any terrorism, conspired to engage in terrorism, aided or 
abetted terrorism, or even intended to further terrorism. The government need 
only show that an individual provided “material support,” which includes 
virtually any service or thing of value, to a group that has been labeled a 
“foreign terrorist organization.”145 Under this law, humanitarian donations of 
blankets to a hospital or of coloring books to a daycare center are crimes if the 
recipient has been designated a terrorist. The Justice Department has taken the 
position that the law criminalizes training or assistance in human rights 
advocacy, even if it is established that the intent and effect of the assistance is 
 
142. Phillip K. Dick, The Minority Report, in 4 The Collected Stories of Philip K. 
Dick: The Days of Perky Pat 71 (1987). 
143. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006), has 
also provided the basis for penalizing “material support.” It t has been invoked to designate certain 
individuals and groups as “terrorist” without even applying the statutory criteria Congress set forth 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) and 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006), and to criminalize all transactions with 
such persons or groups. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001); 
Al Haramain Islamic Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Or. 2008). 
144. Cole & Lobel, supra note 52, at 49; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Counterterrorism White Paper 10-14 (2006), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf (listing the Justice 
Department’s major terrorism prosecutions, most of which are under the “material support” 
statute). 
145. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
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to reduce violence by encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes.146 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has struck down as unconstitutionally 
vague the law’s prohibitions on the provision of “training,” “services,” and 
some forms of “expert advice and assistance,” but has otherwise upheld the law 
against constitutional challenge.147 
The material support law is for all practical purposes indistinguishable 
from a law imposing guilt for mere membership in a proscribed group. The 
courts have, however, generally rejected claims that the law imposes guilt by 
association, maintaining that the law permits individuals to join proscribed 
groups but forbids them from providing the groups with “material support.”148 
But this distinction reduces the right of association to a mere formality, because 
virtually any associational penalty can be recast as a prohibition on material 
support. The right to join an organization is meaningless if the state can bar any 
payments of dues or donations, and even the volunteering of one’s time. 
The material support laws serve much the same function as the McCarthy-
era “guilt by association” laws and the World War I laws criminalizing speech 
critical of the war.149 In each instance, it is not the defendant’s proscribed 
conduct—whether material support, membership, or speech—that poses a 
threat to the state. The concern is rather that if people are allowed to speak, 
associate, and support organizations freely, those organizations might be 
strengthened, and might take dangerous action in the future. In this sense, the 
statutes are preventive in purpose. And because they are drafted so broadly, 
they can be employed to incarcerate individuals preventively, without proving 
that they have undertaken any actual harmful conduct. The problem, however, 
is that while some people tried and convicted for “material support” may pose a 
real threat to the nation’s security, the laws’ overbreadth means that many who 
do not pose such a threat may nonetheless fall within their proscriptions. In this 
sense, they are inaccurate proxies for actual dangerousness, and, as preventive 
measures, are vastly overinclusive. 
In order to limit the extent to which the material support laws serve a de 
facto preventive-detention function, they should be amended to incorporate an 
express requirement of intent to further a proscribed group’s illegal ends. That 
 
146. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122, 1134 (9th Cir. 2007), as 
amended by 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
147. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 1122 (holding these provisions 
unconstitutional but rejecting arguments that the statute as a whole violates the Fifth Amendment 
by failing to honor the principle of individual culpability); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 
F.3d 1130 (holding prohibitions on “personnel” and “training” were unconstitutionally vague, but 
rejecting a First Amendment challenge to the statute for imposing guilt by association). 
148. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 204 F.3d at 1133 (finding that “[t]he 
statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated groups or vigorously promoting 
and supporting the political goals of the group”); United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 
1015 (D. Minn. 2008). 
149. See Cole, supra note 38, at 234. 
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is the line the Supreme Court eventually drew, as a constitutional matter, with 
respect to laws penalizing association with the Communist Party.150 The intent 
requirement ensured that if one associated with the Party only to advance its 
legitimate ends (such as civil-rights advocacy and union organizing), one could 
not be prosecuted. If, by contrast, one joined the Party with intent to further its 
illegal ends of violent overthrow of the state, one could be convicted. That line, 
the Court insisted, was necessary to distinguish those morally culpable from 
those exercising their rights to associate with a group having both legal and 
illegal ends.151 The same principle ought to apply to the material-support 
statute. 
This does not mean that those supporting terrorists will be able to avoid 
prosecution by writing “bake sale” in the subject lines of their checks to a 
terrorist entity. Proof of intent to further illegal ends is required under 
conspiracy laws, and prosecutors obtain convictions under such laws on a 
regular basis. The requisite intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 
including what was said about the donation, the donees’ track record, the 
donor’s due diligence, the character of the group, and the nature of the aid. 
Such an intent requirement would focus the “material support” laws on 
their legitimate purpose of proscribing support to terrorist activity, conform the 
statutes to First and Fifth Amendment principles, and reduce the likelihood that 
this otherwise overbroad law will be abused for sub rosa preventive-detention 
purposes. The broader the criminal statute, the more tempting it will be as a 
tool to target individuals for de facto preventive detention. 
D. Military Detention of Enemy Combatants 
Since Congress authorized the use of military force against the 
perpetrators of 9/11 and those who harbor them, and President Bush launched 
an attack on Afghanistan in 2001, the United States military has detained well 
over a thousand “enemy combatants” allegedly connected to these conflicts.152 
 
150. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 
11 (1966); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). 
151. Scales, 367 U.S. at 209-10. 
152. President George W. Bush, Speech on Terrorism at the White House (Sept. 6, 2006), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html. The 
military has detained approximately 775 persons at Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, of whom about 
245 remained as of March 2009. Andy Worthington, The Guantánamo Files: The Stories 
of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (2007); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
Detainee Transfer Announced, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/ 
release.aspx?releaseid=12449. In addition, as of March 2009, about 600 persons were detained as 
“enemy combatants” at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan. Helene Cooper & Sheryl Gay 
Stolberg, Obama Ponders Outreach to Elements of the Taliban, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2009, at A1 
(reporting that there are approximately 600 prisoners held at Bagram). An undisclosed number of 
others were detained in CIA secret prisons, or “black sites,” but President Obama closed those 
facilities on his second day in office. Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,897 (Jan. 22, 2009) 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
ClosureOfGuantanamoDetentionFacilities. 
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Some were captured on the battlefield; others were found as far from 
Afghanistan as Bosnia, Africa, and Chicago’s O’Hare Airport.153 Many are 
being held in Afghanistan at Bagram Air Force Base;154 approximately 775 
have been held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, where many remain.155 An 
undisclosed number have been detained in secret CIA prisons (which were 
closed by President Obama in one of his first actions as President).156 Some of 
the detainees are said to have been members of the Taliban or al Qaeda military 
forces carrying weapons on the battlefield, but others are accused merely of 
being “associated” in an unspecified way with one of those groups.157 Many 
have been detained for more than seven years.158 
The Bush administration initially took the extreme position that it could 
hold anyone it labeled an “enemy combatant” indefinitely, without charges or a 
hearing, and without the protections of the Geneva Conventions.159 The 
administration argued, in effect, that no law limited its authority to hold anyone 
it so labeled, and that no court had the power to question that extraordinary 
assertion of power. That position led, not surprisingly, to charges that 
Guantánamo was a “legal black hole.”160 Soon, accounts of abusive 
interrogation tactics began to leak out—meticulously recorded by the Army 
itself in interrogation logbooks, and by the FBI in emails and memos objecting 
to th e abuses its agents observed there.161 Guantánamo became a focal point of 
international condemnation of the United States’ approach to the “war on 
terror.” One of President Obama’s first actions as President was to order that 
Guantánamo be closed within a year.162 
 
153. Al Qaeda Arrests Worldwide, FoxNews.com, Nov. 22, 2002, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,64199,00.html. 
154. Tim Golden, Defying U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 
2008, at A1. 
155. Id. 
156. Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 152; Craig Whitlock, U.S. Faces Scrutiny Over 
Secret Prisons, Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 2005, at A20. 
157. Mark Denbeaux et al., Report on Guantánamo Detainees: A Profile of 57 
Detainees Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data 9 (2006), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf. 
158. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, A Prison of Shame, and It’s Ours, N.Y. Times, May 4, 
2008, at WK13. 
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Captured in Iraq, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 2004, at A1; Press Release, White House Office of the 
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Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/38727.htm. 
160. Lord Steyn, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, Guantánamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 
27th F.A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 25, 2003); William Glaberson, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Lawyers at 
Guantánamo, N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 2007, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/26/washington/26gitmo.html. 
161. Sands, supra note 56 (discussing development and implementation of order 
authorizing coercive interrogation tactics at Guantánamo); Eric Lichtblau & Scott Shane, Report 
Details Dissent on Guantánamo Tactics, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2008, at A21. 
162. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, supra note 152. 
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Closing Guantánamo, however, will not resolve the difficult question of 
what to do with the men still detained there, or with the hundreds more held at 
Bagram Air Force Base. President Bush’s ad hoc approach to the problem, 
assertedly predicated on Congress’s AUMF and his powers as commander in 
chief, was a legal and political disaster. The Bush administration took a 
maximalist position from the start. It insisted that it need not provide any 
hearings to ensure that detainees were in fact enemy combatants; that the 
detainees were not protected by the Geneva Conventions, and therefore could 
be subjected to harsh coercive interrogations; and that the detainees had no 
recourse to judicial protection. The Supreme Court rejected each of these 
arguments, as did most of world opinion.163 
Closing Guantánamo will restore legitimacy only if the Obama 
administration adopts a policy that clearly rejects the illegitimate aspects of the 
Bush administration approach.  
Human rights groups have responded to the abuses at Guantánamo by 
arguing that the government must either “try or release” the detainees.164 It 
should try those who are charged with crimes in fair trials, preferably in civilian 
criminal courts, and release the rest. At the opposite end of the spectrum from 
the human rights groups, Professors Neal Katyal and Jack Goldsmith have 
proposed that Congress enact a statute creating a national security court 
empowered to detain “suspected terrorists” indefinitely.165 Such a scheme, 
applicable to foreign nationals and citizens alike, and without any link to a 
military conflict, would create a permanent authority to bypass criminal 
prosecution for anyone deemed to be a “suspected terrorist.” 
In my view, both proposals are misguided. The “try or release” position 
disregards the legitimate, if limited, role of preventive detention in an ongoing 
military conflict, and would inappropriately tie the United States’ hands. 
Detaining enemy soldiers has long been a recognized incident of war.166 It was 
not the concept of detaining the enemy that made Guantánamo an international 
embarrassment, but the way the Bush administration asserted that power—
defining the category of “enemy combatants” far too expansively, refusing to 
 
163. In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 
(2008), the Court held that detainees at Guantánamo were entitled to habeas corpus review of the 
legality of their detentions. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), the Court held that 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict with al Qaeda, and in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), the Court held that a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy 
combatant was constitutionally entitled to a fair hearing on whether he was an enemy combatant. 
164. See, e.g., Jameel Jaffer & Ben Wizner, Don’t Replace the Old Guantánamo with a 
New One, Salon.com, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.salon.com/opinion/ 
feature/2008/12/09/guantanamo/print.html; Michael Ratner & Jules Lobel, Don’t Repackage 
Gitmo!, Nation, Nov. 25, 2008 (President and Vice-President of Center for Constitutional Rights 
advocating “try or release” approach), http://www.thenation.com/doc/20081215/ 
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165. Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 2. 
166. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. 
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provide hearings to determine whether the detainees were actually combatants, 
subjecting them to inhumane interrogation tactics, asserting the right to detain 
them as long as the “war on terror” continued, and claiming that no law 
restricted its actions there. As long as the United States is engaged in an active 
military conflict in Afghanistan, detention, narrowly defined and properly 
implemented according to the laws of war, should be an option for those 
fighting against us. Indeed, it would be irresponsible to release persons we had 
strong reason to believe were fighters for al Qaeda or the Taliban and would 
resume fighting upon release. Closing Guantánamo and restoring the rule of 
law therefore need not mean the release of all those detained there, or even the 
release of all those who cannot be tried criminally. However, if the United 
States seeks to continue to hold some Guantánamo detainees in preventive 
detention without criminal trial, it must do so in a way that is legitimate, 
carefully constrained by law, and meticulously fair. 
The Katyal-Goldsmith proposal to authorize detention of “suspected 
terrorists” is even more problematic. Such a statute, not tied to the traditions 
and limitations of military detention during armed conflict, would be 
unprecedented and unconstitutional. It fails the threshold test of establishing the 
inadequacy of criminal prosecution. Terrorism, after all, is a crime. It has 
historically been addressed through criminal prosecution, and there is no reason 
to believe that terrorist crimes cannot continue to be so addressed. Two former 
federal prosecutors recently reviewed over one hundred criminal prosecutions 
of terrorist crimes, and concluded that the criminal justice system is fully 
capable of handling such cases.167 Absent a showing that terrorism cannot be 
prosecuted criminally, there is no constitutional justification for bypassing the 
criminal process anytime a crime can be labeled “terrorist.” 
Moreover, once we start carving out categories of criminal offenders who 
can be detained indefinitely without being charged with or convicted of any 
criminal conduct, it may be difficult to resist extension of such measures to 
other crimes. There is no categorical difference between terrorism and any 
number of other serious crimes. If “suspected terrorists” warrant preventive 
detention, why not suspected murderers, rapists, gang leaders, or drug 
kingpins? 
Even if the preventive detention category were restricted to “terrorists,” 
that term has often been very expansively defined. Federal law treats as 
“terrorist” even nonviolent conduct, such as the provision of humanitarian 
support to a designated group,168 and also treats as terrorist virtually any use or 
threat to use a weapon against person or property,169 regardless of whether it 
 
167. See generally Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., Human Rights First, 
In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts (2008). 
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006) (criminalizing as a terrorist crime the provision of material 
support to designated “terrorist organizations”). 
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targets civilians or is intended to terrorize a population. The breadth of the 
definition of “terrorism” will in turn contribute to the slippery slope problem. If 
preventive detention were authorized for persons suspected of making 
humanitarian donations to the “wrong” groups, shouldn’t it be authorized for 
persons suspected of violent crimes? Even without such extensions, the sweep 
of the federal definition of “terrorism” would permit the imposition of 
preventive detention on persons who could certainly be addressed through the 
criminal justice system. 
Terrorism should have nothing to do with the justification for preventive 
detention. Instead, detention should be predicated on, and restricted by, the 
customs and laws of war. Where terrorists are engaged in armed conflict, they 
may be detained on the same terms as others so engaged—but they should be 
detained because they are engaged in armed conflict, not because they are 
terrorists. Where terrorists are not engaged in an ongoing armed conflict, the 
threats they pose can and should be addressed through the criminal justice 
system, and there is no precedent for subjecting them to preventive detention 
A statute authorizing preventive detention only of combatants in an 
ongoing armed conflict would create an authority definitionally restricted to 
wartime, and therefore would be less likely to invite a slippery slope. Military 
detention of persons engaged in an ongoing armed conflict—regardless of 
whether the conflict or the individuals have anything to do with “terrorism”—
has long been a “fundamental incident” of warfare.170 Thus, if long-term 
detention of some of the individuals held at Guantánamo and Bagram Air Force 
Base is authorized, it is because at the time of detention they were engaged in 
armed conflict against the United States, and continue to pose an ongoing threat 
that they will return to hostilities—not because they are “suspected terrorists.”  
Looking to the laws of war, the Supreme Court has ruled that as long as 
fair procedures are provided, the Constitution does not prohibit the United 
States from holding even U.S. citizens as “combatants” if they are captured on 
the battlefield fighting for the enemy.171 Because of the unusual nature of the 
conflict against al Qaeda, however, neither the laws of war nor the Constitution 
provide precise guidance on who may be detained, for how long, and pursuant 
to what procedures. 
No one disputes that a nation fighting a traditional international armed 
conflict with another nation may capture and detain enemy soldiers for as long 
as the conflict lasts. The conflict with al Qaeda, however, is not traditional. Al 
Qaeda is not a state and has not signed the Geneva Conventions. Yet we 
continue to be engaged in an ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda and the 
 
and for purposes of designating “terrorist organizations”). 
170. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507; see generally Geremy C. Kamens, International Legal 
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Taliban, centered in Afghanistan. Unlike the ill-conceived “war on terror,” the 
conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban is not a metaphor or a slogan. Al Qaeda 
declared war on the United States,172 and has attacked it both at home and 
abroad. The Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden, and permitted al 
Qaeda to operate within its borders. The attacks of 9/11 were recognized by 
both NATO and the United Nations Security Council as warranting a military 
response in self-defense,173 and approximately 120 nations signed on to the 
United States’ invasion of Afghanistan.174 As of March 2009, the fighting 
continued, with no immediate end in sight.175 
If the United States could hold Italians fighting against it during World 
War II in military detention, should different rules apply to Taliban and al 
Qaeda members fighting against it in Afghanistan? One argument for 
differential treatment would draw a distinction based on the relative availability 
of criminal sanctions in a traditional international armed conflict and the 
conflict with al Qaeda, a nonstate actor. As argued above, preventive detention 
is generally permissible only where criminal prosecution is inadequate to 
address a particular danger. In a traditional war between states, military 
detention is often the only option available for incapacitating the enemy short 
of killing them. Under the laws of war, soldiers are entitled or privileged to 
fight, meaning that they may not be tried criminally for doing so.176 The 
criminal law literally cannot address the very substantial danger posed by 
armed soldiers under orders to kill in an international armed conflict, and 
preventive detention is accordingly permissible. 
By contrast, al Qaeda has no legally recognized right to wage war against 
the United States. It is a nonstate actor, and according to the Supreme Court, 
the United States’ conflict with al Qaeda is therefore a “non-international 
armed conflict.”177 Al Qaeda’s actions can be—and for the most part have 
been—criminalized by the United States, at least where they are directed at 
doing harm to U.S. persons or property. There is therefore no formal legal 
impediment to addressing through criminal law much of the threat that al 
Qaeda poses. And in its criminal justice system, the United States has 
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177. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-30 (2006). 
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successfully prosecuted many persons associated with al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups.178 Thus, one might argue that because the criminal process is 
available to incapacitate al Qaeda fighters, the alternative of preventively 
detaining them should not be permitted. 
But this may be too formalistic. As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson has pointed 
out, there are many potentially legitimate reasons not to proceed against one’s 
enemy in an armed conflict exclusively through the criminal process, even 
where, as in a non-international armed conflict, there is no formal law-of-war 
impediment to doing so.179 These include the difficulty of collecting and 
preserving evidence in war settings, the increased need for secrecy in a military 
conflict, the diversion of scarce resources from the military struggle to the 
courtroom, the possibility that enemies might use the criminal process to pass 
information to their compatriots, and heightened security concerns presented by 
trying a military foe in a public courtroom.180 
Moreover, it is not clear why the fact that al Qaeda is engaged in warfare 
that is itself a crime should restrict the United States’ military options in 
defending itself, so long as a military response is legally justified in the first 
place. The United States has the right, under the laws of war, to try al Qaeda 
fighters for ordinary crimes or war crimes. But should it be required to try them 
while the conflict continues? War-crimes trials typically occur at the conclusion 
of a war, because a nation at war has a strong interest in devoting its resources 
to the conflict itself, and in not revealing what it knows about the enemy. The 
fact that some detainees in a traditional, international armed conflict may be 
triable for crimes (e.g., those who target civilians or fail to wear distinctive 
uniforms, and therefore surrender their prisoner of war status, or those who, as 
prisoners of war, commit crimes in detention) does not mean that these 
prisoners must either be tried or released. Rather, they may be held as 
combatants for the duration of the conflict, and tried (or not) at the state’s 
discretion. If the availability of a criminal prosecution does not eliminate the 
option of preventive detention while an international armed conflict is ongoing, 
why should the availability of such a prosecution in a non-international armed 
conflict bar military detention? 
The state may also legitimately prefer preventive detention to prosecution 
during wartime because of differences in the burden of proof. In criminal cases, 
including for war crimes, the government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.181 Suppose that the government has “clear and convincing evidence” 
 
178. Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 167. 
179. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 303-12 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (cataloguing problems with employing the criminal 
justice system to try terrorists during wartime), vacated as moot, Al-Marri v. Spagone, 2009 WL 
564940 (Mar. 6, 2009). 
180. Id. 
181. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, sec. 3, § 949l(c), 
120 Stat. 2600, 2616 (2006); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 794-95 (1952) (criminal conviction 
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that an individual was captured while actively engaged in armed conflict for al 
Qaeda or the Taliban, and good reason to believe he would resume fighting if 
released. Now suppose that the government is nonetheless unable to convince a 
jury—civilian or military—that the individual is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of a specific crime. Must he be released? An Italian soldier who 
prevailed in a war-crimes trial during World War II would not be entitled to 
release on acquittal, but only upon the cessation of hostilities. Why should an 
unprivileged belligerent fighting for an entity that has no right to fight receive 
more favorable treatment?  
For these reasons, it seems likely that detaining al Qaeda or Taliban 
members actively engaged in armed conflict with the United States is at least 
consistent with, and not proscribed by, the laws and customs of war. Moreover, 
the Supreme Court has ruled that detention of at least some “enemy 
combatants” during armed conflicts is consistent with the Constitution, 
provided that the procedures for determining a detainee’s status are sufficiently 
robust to satisfy due process.  
The Court’s decision in Hamdi, however, hardly resolved the issue. 
Disputes continue to rage over both the proper substantive scope of “enemy 
combatant” detention, and over the procedures that alleged combatants are due. 
The disputes are exacerbated by the fact that the only congressional statement 
on the issue is the AUMF, which does not even mention detention, but simply 
authorizes the use of all “necessary and appropriate” military force. If 
preventive detention of “enemy combatants” is to continue, it should be 
defined—and carefully circumscribed—by legislation. The power to hold a 
human being indefinitely is too grave to delegate to executive experimentation. 
Such a statute would have to address both the proper substantive scope of the 
detention power, and the procedural guarantees available to those subjected to 
it. 
1. Substantive Constraints: Who May Be Detained and for How Long? 
Military detention should be used only against combatants in an armed 
conflict, and may last only as long as the particular armed conflict that justifies 
it. The first questions with respect to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, then, are 
who may be detained, and for how long? 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court in Hamdi held that as an incident to 
war, the executive could detain persons captured on the battlefield in 
Afghanistan fighting on behalf of the Taliban against the United States.182 If 
one concedes that some individuals may be subject to detention in connection 
with the Afghanistan conflict, then Hamdi identified the core case for 
 
requires state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
182. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
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detention. But what about people captured far from the battlefield? What about 
members of al Qaeda or the Taliban who have never actually fought against the 
United States? What about those who sympathize with al Qaeda, and may even 
be inspired by the group to engage in terrorism, but have not themselves joined 
al Qaeda? What about someone who provides financial support to al Qaeda or 
the Taliban, but is not a member of either? What about someone who has 
provided medical attention to a Taliban fighter? 
The Bush administration took an extraordinarily expansive view of who 
could be detained as an “enemy combatant.” It defined the category as 
containing not only members of al Qaeda or the Taliban, but also those who 
have merely “support[ed]” al Qaeda or Taliban forces, and those who are 
members or supporters of other groups “associated” with al Qaeda or the 
Taliban “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.”183 This goes too far. If one analogizes to World War II, for example, 
such a standard would have allowed the United States to detain as “enemy 
combatants” not only those enlisted in the German armed forces, but anyone 
who paid taxes in Germany, worked in a German munitions factory, or treated 
a German soldier in a hospital. 
The Obama administration has advanced a somewhat more limited 
definition of those it may hold in military detention. Where the Bush 
administration claimed it could detain anyone who provided any support 
whatsoever to al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated groups, the Obama 
administration has asserted that it may detain those who provide “substantial 
support” to those groups.184 It declined to define “substantial,” but did state that 
the scope of its detention authority should be governed by law-of-war 
principles.185 It failed to elaborate, however, on what law-of-war principles 
would dictate regarding military detention of “supporters” as opposed to 
members of an enemy armed force. At oral argument, the government’s lawyer 
asserted that the term would encompass those who provide financing to al 
Qaeda.186 Moreover, its proposed definition, like that of President Bush, is not 
predicated on a specific legislative directive, but is instead an act of executive 
interpretation based only the AUMF, which as noted above, does not even 
 
183. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting 
definition of “enemy combatant” contained in Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz’s July 
7, 2004 order creating Combatant Status Review Tribunal). 
184. See Respondent’s Memo Regarding the Gov’t’s Det. Auth. Relative to Detainees Held 
at Guantánamo Bay, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 
2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/ documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf. The brief 
maintained that this definition was tentative because President Obama’s comprehensive review of 
detention policies had not yet been completed. See id. at 10-11.      
185. Id. at 1 (stating that “[p]rinciples derived from law-of-war rules governing 
international armed conflicts, therefore, must inform the interpretation of the detention authority 
Congress has authorized for the current armed conflict”). 
186. Hamlily v. Obama, No. 05-0763, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43249, *34 (D.D.C. May 19, 
2009). 
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mention the term “detention,” much less seek to define its proper confines.   
Others have argued that only those captured on the battlefield or foreign 
soil should be subject to military detention, at least as long as the ordinary 
courts are open and available at home. For example, several members of an en 
banc panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
only those captured on a foreign battlefield or as part of a foreign nation’s 
military could be detained as “enemy combatants.”187 The judges maintained 
that they were only interpreting the AUMF, but their reasoning suggested that it 
might be unconstitutional to extend military detention any further. As a 
constitutional principle, this seems too restrictive. If an enemy fighter is 
captured outside the field of battle, but the capturing nation has reason to 
believe that he is in fact an enemy fighter, and, if let free, would resume 
hostilities against it, why should it be compelled to release him? The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin,188 upholding a war-crimes trial against 
members of the German military who were arrested in the United States, far 
from any battlefield, suggests that military-detention authority need not be 
limited to battlefield captures. Moreover, where the enemy affirmatively seeks 
to attack soft targets and kill civilians, as al Qaeda does, restricting military 
detention to those found on traditional battlefields would significantly 
hamstring U.S. defenses. 
Two courts—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the 
Israeli Supreme Court—recently addressed the question of who may be 
detained as “enemy combatants” in armed conflicts with terrorist organizations. 
Both did so as a matter of domestic law, but with explicit reference to the 
international law of war (which informs statutory interpretation in both Israel 
and the United States). Both courts also took into account the need to adapt the 
law of war to the changed circumstances presented by military conflicts with 
nonstate terrorist organizations. Their decisions provide helpful guidance in 
determining the appropriate scope of “enemy combatant” detention in a 
military conflict with a terrorist organization. 
The Fourth Circuit, in Al-Marri, considered whether a Qatari citizen 
lawfully residing in the United States could be detained as an enemy 
combatant.189 Al-Marri was arrested on criminal charges related to identity 
fraud and lying to FBI agents, but was transferred to military custody shortly 
before he was to go on trial.190 The United States alleged that al-Marri trained 
in an al Qaeda training camp, worked closely with and took orders from al 
Qaeda leaders, and came to the United States as an al Qaeda agent for the 
 
187. See Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 217-53 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., 
concurring). 
188. 317 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1942). 
189. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219. 
190. Id. 
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purpose of engaging in and facilitating terrorist activities.191 In a splintered 
opinion, a bare majority of the en banc court held that if the allegations were 
true, al-Marri could be detained as an “enemy combatant,” but that he had not 
been afforded due process in determining whether the allegations were true.192 
The Supreme Court granted al-Marri’s petition for certiorari, but the Obama 
administration then indicted him in a civilian criminal court, thereby avoiding a 
Supreme Court adjudication of the scope of its detention power.193 
In the court of appeals, Judge Wilkinson’s concurring opinion provided 
perhaps the most illuminating discussion of who may be detained as an enemy 
combatant. Articulating a three-part test guided by the laws of war and the 
Constitution, Judge Wilkinson would require the government to establish that 
an individual is: (1) a member of (2) an organization against whom Congress 
has authorized the use of military force (3) who “knowingly plans or engages in 
conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property for the purpose of 
furthering the military goals of the enemy nation or organization.”194 The first 
two criteria, Wilkinson explained, concern whether the individual is an 
“enemy,” a term that in his view encompasses only those who are members of 
an entity against whom Congress has authorized the use of military force.195 
Congress did not authorize the use of military force against all terrorists, nor 
could it have. It authorized force only against those who perpetrated 9/11 and 
those who harbored them. Accordingly, a terrorist who does not belong to al 
Qaeda or the Taliban is not an enemy in this military conflict, and would not be 
subject to preventive detention under this scheme, no matter how dangerous he 
may be perceived to be. 
Judge Wilkinson’s third criterion addresses whether the individual is a 
“combatant” and serves to distinguish “mere members” from those actually 
engaged in hostilities on behalf of the enemy.196 The laws of war distinguish 
between combatants and civilians. Judge Wilkinson’s third criterion does much 
the same thing. It distinguishes between those who merely associate with an 
enemy and those who are actually part of the enemy’s fighting forces. Only the 
latter may be preventively detained. 
The Israeli Supreme Court has also addressed who may be detained in an 
armed conflict with a terrorist organization—in this case, Hezbollah.197 The 
Israeli legislature, unlike the U.S Congress, has addressed the question of 
 
191. Id. at 220. 
192. Id. at 216. 
193. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (Dec. 5, 2008); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
Ali Al-Marri Indicted for Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda (Feb. 27, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-ag-177.html. 
194. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 325 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
195. Id. at 323. 
196. Id. at 324. 
197. See CrimA 6659/06 A v. State of Israel, [2008] IsrSC 1, translation available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf. 
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detention of “enemy combatants” through detailed legislation. The Israeli 
Supreme Court upheld Israel’s Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law, which 
authorizes detention of individuals who “took part in hostilities against the 
State of Israel, whether directly or indirectly,” or who are “member[s] of a 
force carrying out hostilities against the State of Israel.”198 The court 
interpreted the law in light of both Israel’s Basic Law and the international laws 
of war to authorize detention where there has been an individualized 
determination that a person meets one of the above categories. 
The court noted that in a traditional international armed conflict, 
“unlawful combatants” are not treated as “combatants,” a term limited to those 
privileged to fight and covered by the Third Geneva Convention, but are 
instead treated as a subset of “civilians,” protected by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention.199 However, it also noted that the Convention permits detention of 
civilians where detention is “absolutely necessary” to the security of the state, 
and is subject to judicial or administrative review.200 The court stressed that to 
meet the requisite showing of necessity, an individualized determination must 
be made, and construed the Israeli law to require a showing by “clear and 
convincing evidence” that the individual either (1) took a non-negligible part in 
hostilities against Israel, or (2) was a member of an organization engaged in 
such hostilities and “made a contribution to the cycle of hostilities in its broad 
sense.”201 
Moreover, because the justification for detention is preventive, the court 
held that periodic review is required to ensure that detention lasts no longer 
than absolutely necessary.202 In addition, the court ruled that as the length of 
detention increases, the strength of the evidence that the individual poses a 
threat must also increase.203 Thus, a detention that is marginally justified at its 
outset may cease to be justified three months later if the government does not 
offer additional evidence that the individual poses a threat. This increasing 
evidentiary requirement is predicated on the notion that as detention is 
extended, the burden on individual liberty increases, and therefore a 
proportionally stronger showing is required to warrant further detention.204 
Detention may last no longer than is necessary, and in no event longer than the 
hostilities that triggered it in the first place. 
The Israeli Supreme Court’s approach to enemy-combatant detention is 
more expansive than Judge Wilkinson’s in two respects. First, it authorizes 
 
198. Id. at 9 (quoting Section 2 of Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law). 
199. Id. at 15. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. at 20. 
202. Id. at 44. 
203. Id. at 43-44. 
204. This is likely to affect only marginal cases, because where the evidence is very strong 
at the outset, it is unlikely to be weakened by the passage of time, and as long as the showing was 
strong to begin with, it will ordinarily suffice to justify an extended detention. 
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detention of individuals who engage in hostilities regardless of any evidence of 
membership, while Judge Wilkinson would require proof of membership as an 
absolute prerequisite for detention. Second, the Israeli Supreme Court 
authorizes detention based on membership without proof of actual involvement 
in terrorist activity, whereas Judge Wilkinson would require, in addition to 
membership, proof that an individual knowingly planned or engaged in harmful 
conduct “for the purpose of furthering the military goals of an enemy nation or 
organization.”205 In my view, Judge Wilkinson’s narrower approach is more 
consistent with the principles of the laws of war. Absent a requirement of 
membership in (or at least active engagement in the conflict on behalf of) the 
enemy group, it will be difficult to distinguish “enemy combatants” from 
ordinary terrorists. And where terrorist organizations have multiple purposes, 
one cannot automatically assume that all members are in fact “combatants.” 
Still, the two approaches share important core features. First, neither 
predicates detention on the basis of terrorism per se. Rather, both treat 
detention as necessarily tied to active involvement in a military conflict. Thus, 
Judge Wilkinson would require a showing that an individual is a member of an 
organization against which Congress has authorized the use of military force, 
and the Israeli Supreme Court requires proof of involvement in, or membership 
in an organization involved in, hostilities against Israel. As such, these 
detention regimes are substantially less expansive than a preventive-detention 
regime targeted at “suspected terrorists.”  
Requiring involvement in armed conflict imposes a significant constraint 
on the use of preventive detention. It can only be employed in wartime, only for 
the duration of the conflict, and only against actual combatants. Over the course 
of its history, the United States has been subjected to many terrorist attacks, at 
home and abroad, but Congress has authorized the use of military force in 
response only once. As heinous as they may be, most acts of terrorism simply 
do not rise to the level of “war,” as that term is widely understood, or justify a 
military response. 
In addition, armed conflicts eventually come to an end. The conflict with 
al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan has lasted eight years, but it is not 
likely to last forever. By contrast, the phenomenon of “terrorism” will always 
be with us. Thus, a detention authority linked to military conflict has a 
definable end point, even if one cannot predict precisely when the end will 
come. By contrast, a preventive-detention statute for “terrorists” would be a 
permanent feature of the law, applicable in ordinary as well as extraordinary 
times, and without any definable end point. 
Second, both Judge Wilkinson’s and the Israeli Supreme Court’s 
approaches to preventive detention are substantially narrower than the Bush 
 
205. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 324 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
COLE FINAL 7/1/2009  12:43 AM 
738 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:693 
administration’s and the Obama administration’s. Neither Wilkinson nor the 
Israeli Supreme Court would permit detention of mere supporters of an enemy 
organization, much less detention of members or supporters of associated 
groups. And neither Judge Wilkinson nor the Israeli Supreme Court would 
permit detention based on membership alone. They both require some evidence 
of involvement in hostilities. This may seem odd, because under traditional 
laws of war, any member of the opposition armed forces may be detained, 
without any need to show that he has planned or engaged in harmful conduct, 
or contributed to the cycle of hostilities. Why do both the Israeli Supreme Court 
and Judge Wilkinson require more than membership? 
The answer, I believe, lies in the difference between membership in a 
terrorist organization and being enlisted in an army. A terrorist organization is a 
political organization, not a military force. It may well have a military wing, 
but many “terrorist organizations” are multipurpose groups, and include 
members who never engage in violence. Hezbollah, for example, is a political 
organization with representation in the Lebanese national legislature.206 Mere 
membership in such an organization should not be a ground for military 
detention, and under the Israeli law, it is not. Just as military detention would 
not be permissible simply because an individual was part of the German civil 
service, military detention should not be permitted simply because an 
individual is a member of a terrorist organization. A scheme of military 
detention predicated on the need to incapacitate the enemy’s combatants 
requires proof of more than mere membership in a “terrorist organization”; it 
requires proof of contribution to hostilities. 
At the same time, membership in a terrorist organization will often be 
more difficult to prove than membership in a fighting army. Terrorist 
organizations tend to operate clandestinely and members often disguise 
themselves among the general population. Thus, proof of formal membership—
a prerequisite for detention under Judge Wilkinson’s definition, although not 
under the Israeli law—may be too high an evidentiary burden in some 
instances. Where the state can demonstrate that an individual directly 
participated in hostilities against the state and on behalf of the enemy, military 
detention may be justified even if the state cannot prove actual membership in 
the organization with which it is at war. In a traditional conflict, mercenaries 
and irregular forces may be detained, even if they are not members of the 
armed forces of the enemy or nationals of the enemy state.207 So, too, an 
individual who is directly engaged in hostilities against the United States on 
 
206. Thanassis Cambanis, Lebanese Presidential Selection Delayed by Deadlock, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 26, 2007, at A8. 
207. Civilians who actively participate in hostilities lose their status as protected civilians 
under the Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention, supra note 29, at art. 3(1); Claude Pilloud 
et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 618 (1987). 
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behalf of al Qaeda or the Taliban ought to be subject to military detention, even 
without proof that he is a formal member of either. As the Israeli Supreme 
Court emphasized, the focus of the inquiry, and the trigger for detention, should 
be the threat the individual poses to the state as part of an ongoing armed 
conflict. 
As we have seen, the Obama administration has tentatively maintained 
that it may detain not only members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated 
forces, but also those who provide “substantial support” to those entities. The 
administration was deliberately vague about what “substantial support” means, 
but indicated that it should be interpreted consistently with law-of-war 
principles. If “substantial support” were limited to those individuals who 
directly support an entity’s hostilities against the United States by fighting with 
it, this definition might be consistent with the laws of war. For example, the 
laws of war say that an individual who was not a member of the German army, 
but fought alongside it, would be subject to detention. However, a wealthy 
German capitalist who ran several businesses that supported the army and paid 
substantial taxes would presumably not be subject to military detention, even 
though he might be said to have provided “substantial support” to the war effort 
through his private businesses and tax payments. It remains to be seen how 
“substantial support” will be construed, but if the Obama administration means 
it to be construed consistently with the laws of war, general support to an 
organization should not be sufficient to warrant detention absent direct 
engagement alongside the organization in military hostilities against the United 
States.208 
Finally, neither the Israeli Supreme Court nor Judge Wilkinson would 
restrict military detention to battlefield captures. This, too, seems appropriate. 
Detention should turn on whether an individual is a combatant and poses a risk 
of returning to battle, not on where he happened to be captured.209 Moreover, in 
an asymmetric conflict with a terrorist group, the enemy will virtually always 
prefer attacking far from any battlefield, for the same tactical reasons that it 
generally takes up terrorism in the first place—it cannot possibly prevail on a 
traditional battlefield.210 Therefore, limiting preventive detention to those 
 
208. One district court has rejected the Obama administration’s contention that its 
detention authority extends to those who are not members of al Qaeda or the Taliban but have 
merely provided “substantial support.” Hamlily v. Obama, No. 05-0763, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
43249, *32-*36 (D.D.C. May 19, 2009). The court concluded that the laws of war permit 
detention of persons who are “part of” enemy forces, but not of persons who have financed or 
supported enemy forces. Id.; see also Gherebi v. Obama, No. 04-1164, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
34649, *122 (D.D.C. April 22, 2009) (holding that detention authority based on “substantial 
support” was limited to persons “who were members of the enemy organization’s armed forces”). 
209. Establishing that an individual is actually a combatant will often be more difficult 
when he is not captured on the battlefield, but assuming he meets the appropriate definition, the 
location of capture should not preclude military detention. 
210. To be clear, I do not mean this explanation of why terrorists choose terrorist tactics as 
a justification of those tactics in any way. In my view, terrorist tactics are unjustifiable, period. 
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captured on the battlefield fails to account for the nature of terrorist warfare, 
and would excessively limit the state’s ability to defend itself. 
In short, military preventive detention should be permissible in the 
ongoing military conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, but only if authorized 
by a statute expressly addressing detention and respecting constitutional and 
law-of-war principles. To be consistent with constitutional and law-of-war 
principles, such a statute should limit detention to (1) persons involved in 
actual hostilities with the United States on the part of al Qaeda or the Taliban; 
or (2) members of al Qaeda or the Taliban who can be shown, by their activities 
or their position in the organization, to have played a direct role in furthering 
military ends, such as through providing training, planning, directing, or 
engaging in hostile military activities. Such persons may be detained only as 
long as the conflict continues and they still pose a threat of returning to 
hostilities. And as detention is extended, the burden on the government to prove 
that threat should be proportionately increased. 
2. Procedural Constraints: What Process Is Due? 
In addition to defining who may be detained and for how long, a 
constitutional preventive-detention statute must provide adequate procedural 
safeguards to ensure that the individuals detained in fact fit the category of 
enemy combatants. The Supreme Court in Hamdi held that at least with respect 
to a U.S. citizen, due process required notice of the factual basis for the 
detention, a meaningful opportunity to rebut that showing, and a neutral 
decision maker.211 This ruling provides an important starting point for analysis 
of what procedures should be applied generally, but it leaves many questions 
unanswered. Do the same due process rights apply to foreign nationals as U.S. 
citizens? What is the burden of proof? Are detainees entitled to lawyers? And 
how should confidential information be treated? 
As a threshold matter, foreign nationals should be afforded no less 
protection than U.S. citizens.212 The process that is due is determined by 
balancing the individual’s interest in liberty against the government’s interest in 
security.213 A foreign national’s interest in being free of detention is the same 
as the U.S. citizen’s in Hamdi. The government’s interest in ensuring that 
 
211.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004). 
212. The threshold constitutional question of the extent to which constitutional protections 
extend to foreign nationals beyond U.S. borders is beyond the scope of this Article. For a 
discussion of that topic, see generally Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution 
(1996); David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantánamo Bay, 
2007-2008 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 47. However, whether or not due process is deemed to apply 
abroad, the competing interests in liberty and security are simply not affected by citizenship 
status, so that Congress should as a matter of fairness require the same procedures for foreign 
nationals and U.S. citizens. 
213. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (applying due process balancing test set forth in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
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enemy combatants do not return to hostilities is also unaffected by the 
citizenship of the detainee. Thus, the basic analysis ought to be the same for 
citizens and foreign nationals. While the government is likely to have increased 
security concerns in some locales—such as when it detains an individual near a 
battlefield or other hostile territory—these considerations can be factored into 
the calculus, but should have identical implications for foreign nationals and 
citizens.214 
The process in Hamdi should be sufficient as a matter of law in all cases. 
For example, Judge Traxler, who cast the decisive vote in the Fourth Circuit’s 
en banc decision in Al-Marri, suggested that more process should be required 
in some circumstances.215 The Hamdi Court ruled that the government may be 
able to establish its case through hearsay affidavits,216 and the government in 
Al-Marri did just that, relying exclusively on an affidavit written by a military 
officer with no firsthand knowledge of the facts he asserted.217 But Judge 
Traxler and four other members of the court noted that the Court in Hamdi 
actually said something more nuanced.218 The Hamdi Court acknowledged the 
government’s arguments about the difficulties of presenting firsthand witnesses 
in connection with battlefield captures, and stated that under those 
circumstances hearsay “may need to be accepted as the most reliable available 
evidence.”219 
Hearsay may not always be “the most reliable available evidence,” Traxler 
pointed out, and should not be accepted where more reliable evidence is 
available. Al-Marri himself was not captured on a battlefield; he was arrested in 
the United States through the ordinary criminal process.220 Given these 
circumstances, Judge Traxler concluded that the government had not shown 
that hearsay was the “most reliable available evidence.”221 If more reliable 
evidence was available and could be used without undermining legitimate 
security concerns, due process would require the government to produce it. In 
other words, Judge Traxler reasoned, the rule of Hamdi is not that hearsay is 
always sufficient, but only that it is sufficient where the government establishes 
that it is the “most reliable available evidence” in light of the government’s 
legitimate security needs.222 Where there is no need to rely on hearsay, it 
should not be permitted, as it directly undermines the individual’s opportunity 
 
214. Cf. A v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, ¶ 73, [2005] 2 A.C. 68, 
127 (appeal taken from England) (U.K.) (law authorizing preventive detention of foreign 
suspected terrorists but not British suspected terrorists violated equality guarantee of the European 
Convention on Human Rights). 
215. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 253 (4th Cir. 2008) (Traxler, J., concurring). 
216. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34. 
217. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 256. 
218. Id. at 265. 
219. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34. 
220. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219. 
221. Id. at 268 (Traxler, J., concurring) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534). 
222. Id. at 268-70. 
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to cross-examine his accusers.  
Moreover, Judge Traxler may not have gone far enough. The due process 
balancing test considers not just the government’s security needs, but also the 
individual’s interest in liberty, and more broadly, the need for fair and accurate 
decision making.223 In addition to asking whether the government has 
established a need to rely on hearsay (or classified evidence, discussed below), 
the court should also ask whether reliance on hearsay negates the individual’s 
meaningful opportunity to respond. Since a meaningful opportunity to respond 
is a necessary component of due process, hearsay should not be permitted 
where it defeats that opportunity. 
A related principle governs judicial review of combatant status 
determinations. In Parhat v. Gates, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
ruled that the government had failed to justify a Guantánamo detention where it 
presented only allegations and accusations based on hearsay, and did not 
provide sufficient information for the court to assess the credibility of the 
government’s sources or their basis for knowing what they alleged.224 Absent 
that information, the court reasoned, it could not provide meaningful review.225 
Just as a failure to provide the court with sufficient evidence to assess the 
reliability of accusations negates the court’s ability to engage in meaningful 
independent review, so too may the failure to provide the detainee with 
sufficient information deprive him of a meaningful opportunity to respond. 
Thus, hearsay should be admitted only where it is “the most reliable available 
evidence” and its use does not defeat the detainee’s meaningful opportunity to 
defend himself. 
What burden of proof should apply to determinations of combatant status? 
Israel requires “clear and convincing evidence” that an individual is an 
unlawful combatant, and as discussed above, the evidentiary threshold required 
increases as the length of detention increases. The same standard should apply 
in the context of the conflict with al Qaeda. The “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard, used in U.S. law for deportation proceedings and pretrial 
detention hearings under the Bail Reform Act,226 is less onerous than the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required for criminal prosecutions. But it 
is substantially higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard that 
governs ordinary civil disputes. Surely the government should be required to 
meet as high a standard to detain an individual indefinitely as to deny bail 
pending trial or to deport a foreign national, actions that impinge less 
substantially on liberty interests. 
 
223. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
224. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 846-47 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
225. Id. 
226. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to deny bail); 
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) (requiring clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence to 
support deportation). 
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Because of the high stakes of detention hearings and the complexity of the 
legal issues involved, detainees should be provided lawyers.227 From the 
perspective of the due process balancing test, there is every reason to require 
that detainees be permitted the assistance of counsel. In many instances, the 
detainees will speak little or no English, and will have had little or no 
experience with the American legal system. Most detainees at Guantánamo 
already have counsel representing them in habeas corpus proceedings, so 
allowing those lawyers to participate in combatant status hearings would come 
at little cost to the government. Security concerns can be addressed by 
imposing reasonable protective orders on the lawyers restricting their 
dissemination of confidential information. And given the enormous stakes for 
the individual—the possibility of indefinite detention—it is essential that the 
process be as fair as possible. 
One of the most difficult issues is how to reconcile the individual’s right 
to notice and an opportunity to respond with the state’s interest in maintaining 
secrecy during an ongoing military conflict. While the military may often have 
a legitimate interest in preserving the confidentiality of information relevant to 
a detention proceeding, its ability to do so should be limited by the same 
principles that govern reliance on hearsay. When determining whether 
confidential information may be employed, two questions should be asked: (1) 
has the government exhausted all options that might protect both its interest and 
the interest of the detainee?; and (2) does the use of confidential information 
preserve the detainee’s meaningful opportunity to defend himself? Unless both 
questions can be answered in the affirmative, the government should not be 
permitted to use confidential information. 
Detainees should be provided with sufficiently detailed information about 
the classified evidence to permit them to respond in a meaningful way to the 
factual allegations against them, much as is required under the Classified 
Information Procedures Act.228 In addition, the government should be required 
to appoint lawyers with security clearances who have full access to all of the 
evidence, and are assigned to challenge the classified evidence on the 
detainee’s behalf. In addition, when periodic detention reviews are conducted, 
 
227. Advocates dispute whether the Supreme Court decided this issue in Hamdi, but it 
remains unsettled. See Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 272-73 (Traxler, J., concurring) (citing the Hamdi 
and Boumediene decisions as leaving evidentiary standards and right to counsel issues to the 
discretion of trial courts within the framework of “the general rule . . . that al-Marri would be 
entitled to the normal due process protections . . . .”). 
228. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2006). The statute permits the use of unclassified summaries 
rather than classified information, but only if will provide the defendant with substantially the 
same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified information. § 
6(c)(1). The European Court of Human Rights recently ruled somewhat analogously that in order 
to provide a person subject to a “control order” with a fair hearing, he must be provided with 
sufficiently detailed allegations to allow him to instruct his attorney on how to make a meaningful 
response. A & Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 3455/05, (February 19 2009), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/499d4a1b2.html. A similar standard should govern here. 
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they should include reviews of whether previously confidential information can 
now be disclosed, as the need for confidentiality will often wane over time. 
Limiting the use of hearsay and confidential evidence, requiring 
disclosure of sufficiently specific allegations to permit the detainee to respond 
meaningfully, applying the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, and 
allowing detainees access to counsel would mark a significant improvement to 
the process previously provided to detainees. Before Hamdi, the Bush 
administration afforded the Guantánamo detainees no hearings whatsoever.229 
After Hamdi, it hastily created “Combatant Status Review Tribunals,” or 
CSRTs, to assess whether the detainee was properly detained as an enemy 
combatant.230 
The CSRT hearings have been widely criticized, including by the 
Supreme Court in Boumediene.231 Detainees were not allowed the assistance of 
a lawyer, even where lawyers already represented them in habeas corpus 
proceedings at no expense to the government.232 The tribunals heard no live 
testimony, but merely reviewed documents containing hearsay, and therefore 
the detainees had no ability to confront witnesses.233 Much of the evidence 
reviewed was treated as confidential and not shown to the detainee, making a 
meaningful rebuttal literally impossible.234 The hearing officers were military 
subordinates of commanders who had already determined—without a 
hearing—that the detainees were enemy combatants, thus calling into question 
the tribunals’ impartiality.235 
Some argue that the CSRT hearings were at least as fair as those generally 
provided pursuant to Article V of the Geneva Conventions, which requires that 
a hearing be provided where there is doubt about a detainee’s status.236 But 
Article V hearings generally take place at or near the field of battle, and as 
such, are necessarily informal.237 Moreover, Article V’s hearings requirement 
was written with a more formal war in mind, where doubt about the status of a 
detainee is likely to be the exception, not the rule. In traditional wars, the vast 
majority of soldiers wear uniforms and are not likely to contest that they are 
 
229. Cole, supra note 5, at 41-42. 
230. Adam Liptak, Tribunal System, Newly Righted, Stumbles Again, N.Y. Times, June 5, 
2007, at A21. 
231. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2269-70 (2008). 
232. Linda Greenhouse, Legal Battle Resuming on Guantánamo Detainees, N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 2, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/02/washington/02scotus.html. 
233. Mark Denbeaux & Joshua W. Denbeaux, No-Hearing Hearings: CSRT: The Modern 
Habeas Corpus? (Dec. 2006) (unpublished manuscript available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951245). 
234. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 469-70 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(quoting an exchange in which a detainee is unable to respond to secret evidence used against 
him), vacated on other grounds, Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 
S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
235. In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 469-70. 
236. Brief of United States at 10, Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (No. 06-1195). 
237. Id. 
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members of the opposing armed forces, as their status as enemy soldiers gives 
them prisoner-of-war protections. 
The Guantánamo hearings, in contrast, generally took place years after the 
detainees were captured and thousands of miles away from the battlefield. This 
fact made it more difficult for the detainees to muster evidence in their 
defense—how do you call a witness from a village in Afghanistan when you 
are being held in Guantánamo? At the same time, the distance from the 
battlefield should make it feasible to provide more attributes of a fair hearing 
with fewer security concerns. Most importantly, in the conflict with al Qaeda, 
where the enemy does not wear uniforms or otherwise identify itself, detentions 
shrouded in doubt are the rule rather than the exception, and therefore the 
possibility of erroneous detentions is much higher. These difficulties do not 
mean that military detention should be categorically rejected. But in these 
circumstances, with much greater doubt about who the detainees are, fewer 
impediments to conducting more formal and fair hearings, and lengthy 
detention at stake, greater procedural protections should be required. 
Congress has thus far left the regulation of enemy-combatant detentions to 
executive innovation. The AUMF is silent on the subject. The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 prescribes procedures for war-crimes trials, but says 
nothing with respect to the process for assessing the propriety of detention 
itself. Given what is at stake, both for the detainees, who may spend years in 
detention, and for the United States, whose reputation has been severely 
damaged worldwide by its failure to accord the detainees a fair process, a 
statute setting forth carefully crafted and fair substantive standards and 
procedures for enemy-combatant detentions should be required. 
Some may object that establishing such a preventive-detention authority 
may open the door to future military responses to organized crime, drug gangs, 
and terrorists generally, accompanied by preventive-detention regimes. But 
while the “global war on terror” invoked by the Bush administration was a 
rhetorical slogan, not a legal state of affairs, there is little doubt that 
Afghanistan is the site of an armed conflict that continues to this day. The same 
has never been true with respect to drugs, organized crime, or any other act of 
terrorism. The situations in which war will be a legitimate response to action by 
a nonstate actor are likely to be exceptional. In addition, the narrow definition 
of “enemy combatant” advocated here, limited to persons engaged in armed 
conflict against the United States on behalf of a specified enemy in a specific 
armed conflict, avoids the problems that the Bush administration’s capacious 
definition created. 
In sum, preventive detention should be predicated on the longstanding 
tradition of detaining enemy fighters during an armed conflict—an 
extraordinary power limited to the extraordinary setting of a specific, ongoing 
war. The nature of the conflict with al Qaeda makes the application of the 
military-detention model more complicated, to be sure, but does not render it 
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wholly inapplicable. The critical point is that the authority to detain should rest 
squarely on an individual’s participation in armed conflict, a fact that can be 
established objectively, and not on vague notions of future danger and 
“suspected terrorism.” Moreover, because the proposed preventive-detention 
authority would be tied to war, it would be triggered only when we are in fact 
at war, and will not be generally applicable to conduct that the community 
considers dangerous, whether it be organized crime, drugs, weapons sales, or 
terrorism. 
E. Short-Term Preventive Detention 
Would a much more limited short-term preventive-detention law for terror 
suspects be appropriate, such as the United Kingdom’s statute authorizing 28 
days of pre-charge detention for terrorism suspects?238 Such a tool might be 
responsive to the hypothetical case in which government officials have credible 
and reliable evidence that an individual poses a serious and imminent danger to 
the community, but cannot immediately make that evidence public. Such cases 
are likely to be extremely rare, and there are sound reasons to question whether 
the United States needs to introduce a new preventive-detention regime for an 
eventuality that is likely to arise infrequently. The more important point, 
however, is that were such a situation to arise, it could be adequately addressed 
under existing legal authority for preventive detention pending a criminal trial. 
As long as the government has probable cause that an individual has 
committed a crime, he can be arrested. The probable cause showing, whether 
made ex parte in advance to a magistrate to obtain an arrest warrant, or in the 
post-arrest probable cause hearing required where an arrest is made without a 
warrant,239 may be based on hearsay that preserves the confidentiality of the 
source of the incriminating information.240 The Bail Reform Act then 
authorizes preventive detention pending trial, and while the government must 
generally demonstrate that the defendant poses a danger to the community or a 
risk of flight, it is again permitted to oppose bail on the basis of hearsay that 
can protect the confidentiality of the source.241 Moreover, the Bail Reform Act 
creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of pretrial detention where a 
defendant faces terrorism charges, and thus effectively places the burden on the 
 
238. See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Police and 
Human Rights (Eleventh Report): 42 Days and Public Emergencies, 2007-2008, H.C. 635, 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/116/116.pdf.  
CLARE FEIKERT, U.S. LIBRARY OF CONG., UNITED KINGDOM: PRE-CHARGE DETENTION FOR 
TERRORIST SUSPECTS (2008), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.php. 
239. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) held that where police make an arrest without a 
warrant, they must bring the arrestee before a court for a prompt probable cause hearing. In 
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), the Supreme Court interpreted Gerstein’s 
“promptness” requirement to mandate a hearing within forty-eight hours of arrest unless the 
government can establish an emergency or extraordinary circumstance justifying a delay. 
240. Gerstein, 430 U.S. at 124 n.25. 
241. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2006). 
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defendant to establish that he is not a danger to the community or a flight 
risk.242 The Speedy Trial Act requires a prompt criminal trial, but defendants 
routinely waive it to allow adequate time to prepare their defense.243 
Hence, existing law should be sufficient to address the situation in which 
the government has confidential information establishing probable cause that 
an individual is engaged in imminent terrorist conduct. Moreover, if the 
individual is a foreign national as to whom the government has evidence of 
terrorist activity, the government may also be able to effectuate short-term 
preventive detention pending immigration proceedings—even if all the 
immigration detention reforms suggested above were adopted. Of course, once 
the time comes for a criminal trial (or a removal hearing), the government may 
have to reveal its sources if it seeks to use confidential evidence affirmatively 
against the defendant. But if it has been able to develop other incriminating 
evidence that can be disclosed, it has the option of not using information whose 
source it would prefer not to reveal. 
Accordingly, the only situations that cannot be addressed adequately by 
the criminal justice system are those where (1) the government lacks probable 
cause of any criminal or immigration violation; or (2) the government cannot 
develop sufficient nonconfidential evidence to hold the defendant criminally 
liable or to establish a deportable offense. In those cases, it is not clear that 
there is a justifiable case for preventive detention. Given conspiracy laws, it is 
difficult to imagine cases where the government has reliable evidence that an 
individual is going to commit an imminent terrorist act, but lacks probable 
cause of any criminal activity. If it lacks even probable cause, society should 
take the risk associated with continued surveillance, as we do with all other 
crimes, rather than permit preventive detention. Similarly, unless we are to 
authorize long-term preventive detention, if the government cannot ultimately 
come forward with admissible evidence that the individual has committed a 
crime, he should be freed. The government could, of course, continue to keep a 
close eye on the individual, and even if no criminal trial is held, its arrest and 
detention may well disrupt any ongoing terrorist plot. 
Because we must start with a presumption that the criminal justice system 
is how we deal with dangerous persons—whether terrorists, murderers, rapists, 
spies, or traitors—we ought not authorize preventive detention absent a strong 
showing that criminal prosecution is inadequate to address a compelling need 
to protect the community from danger. Absent such a showing, there is no 
reason to expand the existing short-term preventive-detention authority, which 
is generally limited to individuals facing criminal or immigration proceedings 
and posing a demonstrable threat to the community or risk of flight. 
 
242. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006); see generally Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 167, at 65-
75 (arguing that existing federal law permits preventive detention of defendants pending criminal 
trial without disclosing confidential information). 
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
The above reforms would have at least two significant benefits. First, they 
would bring preventive detention out of the shadows of existing law, and 
subject it to a more open and accountable process. Second, they would 
simultaneously empower the government to employ preventive detention where 
it is truly necessary while limiting its ability to sweep up large numbers of 
people on little or no evidence of dangerousness. If all of the above reforms had 
been in place on 9/11—so that the government had available to it a tightly 
regulated preventive-detention authority but was not able to exploit existing 
authorities for sub rosa preventive detention without sufficient safeguards—it 
seems likely that fewer people would have been unnecessarily detained. 
Detainees would have been limited to persons as to whom there was some 
legitimate basis for concern, and the length of detention would have been more 
strictly controlled. Those detained under immigration authorities, for example, 
would not have been subject to preventive detention unless the government had 
objective evidence that they posed a terrorist threat. And many of those 
unnecessarily and wrongly held at Guantánamo for years might not have been 
detained at all. The proposed reforms would reduce the number of unnecessary 
detentions while ensuring that detention remains available where truly 
necessary. And by bringing preventive detention above board and adopting 
rules that apply equally to citizens and foreign nationals, the reform effort 
would force us to confront when preventive detention is truly justified, rather 
than tolerating it as an informal practice as long as it does not apply to the 
majority. 
There remain, however, good reasons to be skeptical about preventive 
detention. First, if a new preventive-detention law were enacted without reform 
of existing laws, it would not mitigate, and might well exacerbate, the abuses 
experienced after 9/11. The Bush administration did successfully obtain 
passage of one new preventive-detention law in the wake of 9/11: Section 412 
of the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorized detention of foreign “terror 
suspects” without charges for up to seven days. But perhaps because the law 
included such safeguards as immediate access to federal court and a strict 
seven-day time limit on detention without charges (adopted over the 
administration’s objections), the government never used it. It found that it 
could lock up literally thousands of foreign nationals, often for longer than 
seven days, by abusing existing immigration laws, obstructing detainees’ 
access to court, and keeping them locked up even after judges had ordered their 
release. If the immigration, material-witness, and material-support laws remain 
unchanged, government officials may continue to exploit them in future crises, 
rather than invoke a new preventive-detention authority that might require a 
stronger showing of need for detention. Thus, under no circumstances should 
Congress enact a preventive-detention statute unless simultaneous reforms of 
existing laws are included as an integral part of the package. 
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Second, even a narrow preventive-detention law might be criticized for 
“normalizing” preventive detention. The number of instances that would truly 
necessitate a freestanding preventive-detention law seems small. During World 
War II, for example, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover argued that en masse 
preventive detention of Japanese Americans was unnecessary because the FBI 
had the capability to place suspected saboteurs under surveillance and charge 
them with a crime if it determined that they were truly dangerous.244 Creating a 
new legal regime for such exceptional circumstances may make the very idea 
of preventive detention more routine and acceptable. One of the checks on 
preventive detention in American legal culture today is that it is still viewed as 
exceptional. Congress should therefore narrowly tailor any reform to 
underscore the exceptional character of preventive detention. Even so, the 
creation of such an authority inherently carries the risk of subsequent “mission 
creep.” In my view, requiring a showing that the criminal justice system is 
inadequate, and tying freestanding preventive detention to an ongoing military 
conflict are critical to reducing that risk. But as with the risk of terrorism itself, 
the risk of “mission creep” cannot be entirely eliminated. 
Third, as suggested in the introduction, any preventive-detention regime 
inevitably presents substantial risks: we cannot predict the future; skewed 
incentives systematically favor erroneous detentions over erroneous releases; 
and preventive detention contradicts a fundamental tenet of liberal 
democracy—that people should be judged by their actions, not their thoughts, 
desires, or associations. One might reasonably conclude that these risks are so 
great that one should not go down this path in the first place. But in that case, 
one would have to show why all the preventive-detention regimes that the 
United States already tolerates—and that most other liberal democracies have 
as well—are not equally illegitimate. I have sought to show that the unifying 
principle underlying legitimate preventive detention is that it is permissible 
only upon a strong showing that the criminal justice system cannot address a 
serious danger to the community. 
Concerns about preventive detention are considerable, and I do not mean 
to minimize them. Reasonable people could conclude that we ought to oppose 
preventive detention wherever it appears. But my own sense is that the camel’s 
nose is already under the tent. Opportunities for de facto and sub rosa 
preventive detention already exist in current law, and the aftermath of 9/11 
provides a blueprint for how the government can exploit them again if we do 
nothing. 
If we are to learn lessons from our mistakes, then, we would do well to 
confront the issue of preventive detention directly. That would require 
amending existing laws to preclude their abuse for unjustified preventive-
 
244. See 117 Cong. Rec. H31551-52 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1971) (remarks of Rep. 
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detention purposes. But it might also include crafting a carefully circumscribed 
preventive-detention authority outside the criminal justice system for those 
engaged in an ongoing military conflict. Such a regime would be justified along 
roughly the same lines that preventive detention of prisoners of war in a 
traditional international armed conflict is justified. Because there are salient 
differences between traditional state-to-state conflicts and military conflicts 
with nonstate actors, however, the rules need to be more circumscribed in the 
latter context. In a conflict with a nonstate actor, there is no per se bar on 
criminalizing the enemy’s engagement in the conflict. At the same time, there 
is likely to be greater doubt about the identity of the enemy, a much longer and 
more nebulous conflict, and an ability on the part of detained individuals to 
choose to abandon the fight. 
These differences require modification of existing rules, but do not, in my 
view, eliminate entirely an appropriate role for military preventive detention in 
ongoing conflicts. Moreover, if we insist that the rule of law knows no place for 
detention of those actively fighting against the state in a military conflict, we 
may unwittingly encourage the state to take matters into its own hands, outside 
any legal limits—much as the Bush administration did. 
What is most critical is that any preventive-detention regime be justified 
as military detention, a concept with fairly well-established parameters, and not 
as detention of “suspected terrorists,” a new and potentially capacious category 
that poses substantial risks of unjustified expansion. These are difficult 
judgments. But in the end, if we were to succeed in bringing preventive 
detention out of the shadows in the ways I have suggested, subjecting it to 
careful controls, we might advance our liberty, our security, and our 
democracy.  
 
 
 
